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MARKET ORIENTALISM: REASSESSING AN 
OUTDATED ANTI-DUMPING POLICY 
TOWARDS THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF 
CHINA 
INTRODUCTION 
rom the perspective of many enterprises operating in the People’s 
Republic of China (“PRC”), U.S. unfair trade law has failed to 
keep pace with the market reforms of the Chinese economy.1 This failure 
has led the United States Department of Commerce (“Commerce”) to 
assume the role of a veritable Janus, simultaneously recognizing and de-
nying the market-oriented features of the PRC’s economy, depending on 
what trade law is being applied.2 In this Note I will evaluate Commerce’s 
current anti-dumping law valuation approach to the PRC and propose an 
alternative PRC anti-dumping policy that balances a pro-market position 
with the goal of promoting equity and bilateral reciprocity. 
Section I of this Note begins with an overview of anti-dumping law as 
applied to market economy (“ME”) countries and non-market economy 
(“NME”) countries, emphasizing the crucial role of valuation methodol-
ogy in calculating dumping margins.3 After detailing the disadvantages 
of being classified as an NME for purposes of anti-dumping law, I will 
explore the current approach of classifying the PRC as an NME for pur-
poses of anti-dumping law, while treating the country as an ME for coun-
tervailing duty (“CVD”) law purposes.4 
                                                                                                                            
 1. Liu Danyang, Comment on Behalf of Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Re-
public of China, Response to Antidumping Methodologies in Proceedings Involving Cer-
tain Non-Market Economies: Market-Oriented Enterprise; Request for Comment, at 7 
(December 10, 2007), http://ia.ita.doc.gov/download/nme-moe/comments-
20071210/boft-nme-moe-cmt-20071210.pdf (stating disapproval with Commerce’s “de-
lay in crafting rules” to address the “inconsistency” between anti-dumping laws for non-
market economies and countervailing duty laws as applied to the People’s Republic of 
China). 
 2. For a discussion of how Commerce assumes in anti-dumping investigations that 
non-market-economy countries have distorted their internal markets so that is impossible 
to measure real prices, but assumes in countervailing duty investigations against the PRC, 
a non-market economy that the real price of government subsidies is measurable, see 
discussion infra, Section I.D.1. 
 3. See Sanghan Wang, Article: U.S. Trade Law Concerning Nonmarket Economies 
Revisited for Fairness and Consistency, 1 EMORY INT’L L. Rev. 593, 615–16 (2005) (dis-
cussing how the method by which normal value is calculated can lead to “potentially 
inaccurate determination[s]”). 
 4. See Memorandum from Shauna Lee-Alaia and Lawrence Norton, Office of Poli-
cy, Import Administration, to David M. Spooner, Assistant Secretary for Import Admin-
istration, Regarding Countervailing Duty Investigation of Coated Free Sheet Paper from 
F 
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Section II will first discuss Commerce’s recent interest in reevaluating 
the PRC’s status as an NME. In pursuit of a possible new approach to an 
anti-dumping framework for the PRC, Commerce has been soliciting 
interested parties for comments on a proposed test to identify certain 
market-oriented enterprises (“MOE”) in order to grant them an individu-
alized valuation methodology.5 Section II will explore multiple perspec-
tives on whether such a test would be legally permissible, whether there 
are actually firms operating in the PRC that could be identified as mar-
ket-oriented, and finally whether such a test would be administratively 
feasible. 
In section III, I take the position that an MOE test would be the most 
pragmatic way for U.S. trade law to address the fact that many PRC 
firms are operating under relatively market-oriented conditions. After 
arguing against the inequitable practice of double counting, section III 
discusses how a recent case, GPX Int’l Tire v. United States, potentially 
requires Commerce to adopt an MOE approach.6 Finally, I attempt to lay 
the framework for a valuation approach that contains elements of both 
ME and NME methodology so that U.S. anti-dumping law may work in 
concert with CVD law to best reflect the current economic reality of the 
PRC.7 
                                                                                                                            
People’s Republic of China, 10 (Mar. 29, 2007), http://ia.ita.doc.gov/download/nme-sep-
rates/prc-cfsp/china-cfs-georgetown-applicability.pdf [hereinafter Georgetown Steel 
Memorandum] (concluding that Commerce is capable of identifying and measuring sub-
sidies bestowed by the PRC government upon Chinese producers). 
 5. See Antidumping Methodologies in Proceedings Involving Certain Non-Market 
Economies: Market-Oriented Enterprise, 72 Fed. Reg. 29, 302, 29, 302 (proposed May 
25, 2007) [hereinafter May 25 Request]; see also Antidumping Methodologies in Pro-
ceedings Involving Certain Non-Market Economies: Market-Oriented Enterprise; Re-
quest for Comment, 72 Fed. Reg. 60, 649, 60, 649 (proposed Oct. 25, 2007) [hereinafter 
October 25 Request] (refining the request for comments to focus on legality, identifica-
tion and administrability). 
 6. See generally GPX Int’l Tire Corp. v. United States, No. 09-103, 645 F. Supp. 2d 
1231, 1251 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2009). 
 7. See Georgetown Steel Memorandum, supra note 4, at 4–5 (stating that the PRC’s 
economy is “more flexible” than the Soviet command-style economies in regard to which 
the NME valuation approach was formulated). 
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I. UNITED STATES ANTI-DUMPING LAWS AND THE NON-MARKET 
ECONOMY 
A. Overview of Anti-Dumping Investigations 
Anti-dumping laws have operated in the U.S. for almost a century8 
with the purpose of preventing low-priced foreign-manufactured goods 
from undercutting U.S. competition and damaging domestic manufactur-
ers.9 Anti-dumping laws operate by imposing a duty on foreign imports 
equal to the amount by which the import is considered undervalued, in 
cases where domestic manufacturers of similar goods (the “domestic in-
dustry”) are hurt by such undervaluation.10 The result of this simple yet 
elegant arithmetic is a price that is intended to reflect what the value of 
the imported merchandise would (or indeed, should) be, were the product 
priced at the “correct” level.11 
An anti-dumping investigation is initiated against foreign exporters ei-
ther by Commerce, or by representatives of the domestic industry.12 In 
order to ensure that the majority of the domestic industry supports the 
investigation, there are certain statutory representation requirements that 
the petitioners must meet.13 Commerce must determine that the petition-
ers represent 25% of the total domestic industry, 50% of those expressing 
an opinion on the issue, and that they have met certain evidentiary stan-
dards in bringing the complaint.14 Although the United States originally 
                                                                                                                            
 8. Daniel M. Lopez, The Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000: “Re-
lief” for the U.S. Steel Industry; Trouble for the United States in the WTO, 23 U. PA. J. 
INT’L ECON. L. 415, 415 (2002) (stating that anti-dumping laws were first implemented in 
1916). 
 9. See NEVILLE PETERSON, CUSTOMS LAW & ADMINISTRATION 1 (2008) (explaining 
that the anti-dumping statute is intended to provide relief to domestic producers that are 
injured, or threatened with injury, because of unfairly priced foreign-manufactured goods 
imported for sale in the US). 
 10. See Patricia H. Piskorski, A Dangerous Discretionary “Duty”: U.S. Antidumping 
Policy Toward China, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 595, 603 (2005) (describing the anti-dumping 
duty as the average amount by which the fair market value of the product in question 
exceeds the price that the product is sold for in the US). 
 11. Lopez, supra note 8, at 417–18. 
 12. See Andrea Miller, The United States Antidumping Statutes: Can A Trade Agree-
ment With The United States Be Both “Free” And Fair? A Case Study Of Chile, 54 
CATH. U.L. REV. 627, 629 (2005) (discussing how an anti-dumping investigation is in-
itiated). 
 13. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(c)(4)(A) (2006). 
 14. See id. 
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resisted implementing this threshold requirement,15 it has since defended 
the requirement on the grounds that “national authorities have a respon-
sibility to examine the petition for accuracy and adequacy of evidence.”16 
Any interested party may respond to the petitioner’s allegations subse-
quent to initiation, but Commerce limits its dumping calculation to a se-
lected group of respondents.17 These mandatory respondents will have 
“within 45 days after the date on which the petition is filed” to present a 
response to the allegations.18 Although the petitioners have generally 
spent significantly more time preparing their case, they also bear the bur-
den of proof that they, as the domestic industry, are injured or threatened 
by foreign dumping.19 Because responsibility for carrying out an anti-
dumping investigation is shared by Commerce and the International 
Trade Commission (“ITC”), the investigation itself is best thought of as a 
process of multiple determinations rather than as a single event.20 For 
example, Commerce is responsible for determining sales at less than fair 
value (“LTFV”), while the ITC is responsible for determining injury.21 
For the purposes of this Note we will primarily consider Commerce’s 
role in the anti-dumping investigation. Commerce initially makes several 
determinations critical to a finding of dumping.22 The initial determina-
tion is based on whether the petitioners have satisfied Commerce that the 
petitioners as a whole makes up a minimum percentage of the domestic 
market for that product in question (the “representation requirement”).23 
Sixty days after the ITC has determined that there is a “reasonable indi-
                                                                                                                            
 15. See Tara Gingerich, Why The WTO Should Require The Application Of The Evi-
dentiary Threshold Requirement In Antidumping Investigations, 48 AM. U.L. REV. 135, 
158–59 (1998). 
 16. See id. at 164. 
 17. See Bernd G. Janzen, International Trade Decisions Of The Federal Circuit: 
Three Years Of Rigorous Review, 52 AM. U.L. REV. 1027, 1074 (2003). 
 18. 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(a)(2)(A)(i) (2006). 
 19. William D. DeGrandis, Proving Causation in Dumping Cases, 20 INT’L L. 563, 
563 (1986). 
 20. See Robert H. Lantz, The Search For Consistency: Treatment Of Nonmarket 
Economies In Transition Under United States Antidumping And Countervailing Duty 
Laws, 10 AM. U.J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 993, 1000–01 (1995). 
 21. Id. at 1001. 
 22. See U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTY 
HANDBOOK II-3 (2008), available at 
http://www.usitc.gov/trade_remedy/documents/handbook.pdf (detailing the various de-
terminations that Commerce must make during the course of an anti-dumping investiga-
tion). 
 23. Id. at I-6. 
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cation” of material injury, 24 Commerce makes its preliminary determina-
tion of dumping, based on whether there is a “reasonable basis to believe 
or suspect that the merchandise is being sold, or is likely to be sold, at 
less than fair value.” 25 Within 75 days of the preliminary determination, 
Commerce will issue its final determination.26 While the preliminary de-
termination included an estimated penalty, at this point Commerce will 
publish a final amount by which a number called normal value exceeds 
export price. This number becomes the estimated dumping margin, sub-
ject only to the additional requirement that the ITC make an affirmative 
finding of material injury.27 
Following the calculation of the dumping margin, the ITC makes its 
final determination on whether or not the inflated prices are harming or 
have the potential to harm the domestic industry.28 The ITC makes this 
determination by evaluating a large number of economic factors relating 
to the affect the imports are having (or may have) on the domestic indus-
try.29 This is a key determination because a finding of no-injury termi-
nates the investigation, regardless of Commerce’s earlier determination.30 
Despite the misleading nomenclature of the “final determination,” the 
actual duties are not calculated until the (very important) annual re-
view.31 During an annual review, the dumping margin is completely re-
assessed, potentially resulting in a revised rate that is substantially differ-
ent than the rate originally assigned.32 
                                                                                                                            
 24. STEPHEN D. COHEN ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF U.S. FOREIGN TRADE POLICY 171 
(2003). 
 25. 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(b)(1)(A) (2006). 
 26. 19 U.S.C. § 1673d (2006). 
 27. See Lantz, supra note 20, at 1001–02 
 28. See id. at 1002. 
 29. See id. at 1002–03. 
 30. See Herbert C. Shelley et al., A Review Of Recent Decisions Of The United States 
Court Of Appeals For The Federal Circuit: Area Summaries: The Standard Of Review 
Applied By The United States Court Of Appeals For The Federal Circuit In International 
Trade And Customs Cases, 45 AM. U.L. REV. 1749, 1759 (1996) (stating that Commerce 
will only publish an anti-dumping order after the ITC has issued an affirmative final de-
termination). 
 31. See Michael A. Lawrence, Bias in the International Trade Administration: The 
Need for Impartial Decision-makers in United States Antidumping Proceedings, 26 CASE 
W. RES. J. INT’L L. 1, n.33 (1994). 
 32. See id. 
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B. Calculating Normal Value 
1. The Importance of Normal Value 
Normal value is the number calculated by Commerce to represent a 
fair price for the imported good in question.33 This number is then held 
up as a benchmark of sorts against the export price (or the constructed 
export price, if the first domestic sale is to an affiliated purchaser). It is 
important to respondents that the normal value be as low as possible, be-
cause the dumping margin itself is calculated as the difference between 
normal value and the export price above.34 This makes an understanding 
of the valuation process absolutely crucial in order to reduce margins by 
as much as possible. The task is complicated by the fact that there are at 
least three methods of calculating normal value in cases involving market 
economy respondents, and an additional method applicable to respon-
dents from non-market economies.35 
While the available methods are analyzed below, it is important to con-
sider that the tension exists between normal value and export price be-
cause the duty is payable not as a flat tax or a levy but as an ad valorem 
duty proportional to the value of the merchandise.36 It follows that when 
the product is being exported in large quantities, a relatively small ad-
justment to normal value can result in significantly higher or lower costs 
for the exporting company. 
2. Normal Value Calculations for Market Economy Exporters 
When the respondent is based in a country that Commerce considers a 
market economy, Commerce will determine normal value using one of 
the three methods.37 Commerce’s first preference is to use the home-
                                                                                                                            
 33. Sungjoon Cho, Anticompetitive Trade Remedies: How Antidumping Measures 
Obstruct Market Competition, 87 N.C.L. REV. 357, 381(2009)  (defining normal value as 
“a normative, fair price, which should have been set in the home (exporting) market 
without any alleged unfair governmental intervention”). 
 34. See Jarrod M. Goldfeder, A Review Of Recent Decisions Of The United States 
Court Of Appeals For The Federal Circuit: Area Summary: 2008 International Trade 
Decisions Of The Federal Circuit, 58 AM. U.L. REV. 975, 1020–21 (2009). 
 35. Id. at 1020–22; See also 19 U.S.C. 1677(35)(A) (2006) (defining the dumping 
margin as “the amount by which the normal value exceeds the export price or constructed 
export price of the subject merchandise”). 
 36. See Bryan A. Edens, Substantial Evidence In The Law Of International Trade: 
Meaningful Judicial Review Of Antidumping Actions Or Perpetuation Of The Yo-Yo Ef-
fect?, 6 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 431, n.62 (2008). 
 37. See Lantz, supra note 20, at 1001. 
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market method.38 Subject to a series of price adjustments, normal value is 
calculated at the price that the product is sold in the market of the export-
ing country for domestic consumption.39 
This constructed value method involves cumulating certain inputs, in-
cluding allowances for profit and other indirect costs.40 Under this me-
thod, normal value is constructed as a sum of a product’s component 
costs.41 Commerce will use results of this exceedingly complex calcula-
tion42 as the as the price against which the export price (or constructed 
export price) is compared, in order to determine the dumping margin.43 
3. Control of the Valuation Process for Market Economy Exporters 
The calculation of normal value remains critically important to the res-
pondents long after the ITC’s final determination. Rather than existing as 
a static number, normal value is generally recalculated annually as part 
of regular review, which is important.44 Furthermore, a change in normal 
value can affect duties already paid as far back as 18 months, which 
gives the respondent great incentive to lower the normal value during 
these annual reviews.45 As a result, exercising control over the valuation 
process is highly valuable to respondents.46 
                                                                                                                            
 38. See Brink Lindsey & Dan Ikenson, Antidumping 101: The Devilish Details of 
“Unfair Trade” Law, CATO INST. TRADE POL’Y ANALYSIS 5 (21 Nov. 2002), 
http://www.cato.org/pubs/tpa/tpa-020.pdf. 
 39. Id. at 6–8 (explaining the price adjustments). 
 40. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(e) (2006) (explaining that the “constructed value” is equal to 
the sum of “the cost of materials and fabrications,” plus “the actual amounts incurred . . . 
by the specific exporter,” plus “all other expenses incidental to placing the subject mer-
chandise in condition packed ready for shipment”). 
 41. Id. 
 42. See Lester Engineering Co. v. United States, 3 C.I.T. 236, 240 (1982) (asserting 
that calculating constructed value “involves a complex compilation and analysis of many 
facts”). 
 43. See Goldfeder, supra note 34, at 1020–21. 
 44. ROBERT FEINSCHREIBER & CHARLES L. CROWLEY, IMPORT HANDBOOK: A 
COMPLIANCE AND PLANNING GUIDE 277–79 (stating that “a new [dumping] rate for each 
exporter . . . is determined as the weighted average of dumping rates found on all sales 
reviewed in each [one year] period”). 
 45. Id. at 279 (explaining that the Uruguay Round Agreements Act imposed a statuto-
ry deadline of 1 year for annual reviews, extendable by 6 months). 
 46. See Brenda A. Jacobs, Comment on Behalf of Chutex Group, Response to Anti-
dumping Methodologies in Proceedings Involving Certain Non- Market Economies: 
Market-Oriented Enterprise; Request for Comment, at 4–5 (June 25, 2007), 
http://ia.ita.doc.gov/download/nme-moe/chutex-nme-moe-cmt-20070625.pdf [hereinafter 
Chutex June 25 Comment] (arguing that because of the unpredictable nature of the valua-
tion process, NME producers are unable to identify the necessary pricing adjustments in 
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When the home or third country market valuation method is used, a 
respondent can exercise control over the normal value by adjusting its 
prices in those markets, potentially affecting a lower dumping margin.47 
Even more significantly, respondents that are able to predict their calcu-
lated normal value with a high level of accuracy are able to adjust their 
selling price in the U.S. to bring their export price up to the proper value 
level and reduce or eliminate the dumping margin.48 
C. Anti-Dumping Investigations Against Nonmarket Economy Exporters 
1. Overview 
Exports from countries on Commerce’s list of NMEs are subject to a 
different valuation process than exports from market-economy coun-
tries.49 If Commerce determines that a country “does not operate on mar-
ket principles of cost or pricing structures, so that sales of merchandise in 
such country do not reflect the fair value of the merchandise” then it has 
the discretion to designate that country as an NME.50 While the anti-
dumping timeline and means of initiating the investigation are the same, 
the process of calculating normal value is markedly different.51 
Commerce is vested with substantial power to determine which coun-
tries are market-oriented for the sake of unfair trade laws.52 In determin-
ing whether to consider a country market-oriented, Commerce will look 
at several statutory factors, including but not limited to the extent of gov-
ernment ownership or control of the means of production and also the 
extent of government control over the allocation of resources and over 
the price and output decisions of enterprises.53 
                                                                                                                            
order to fairly trade their goods with the United States, and asking Commerce to use ac-
tual prices and costs when appropriate). 
 47. David A. Gantz, A Post-Uruguay Round Introduction To International Trade Law 
In The United States, 12 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. LAW 7, 74 (1995). 
 48. See Chutex May 25 Comment, supra note 46, at 5. 
 49. See Joseph A. Laroski, Jr., NMES: A Love Story Nonmarket and Market Economy 
Status Under U.S. Antidumping Law, 30 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 369, 375 (1999). 
 50. Id. at 381–82 (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1677(18)(A) (1994)). 
 51. Id. at 375–76. 
 52. Id. at 381–82; see also 19 U.S.C. § 1677(18)(A) (2006) (defining a “nonmarket 
economy country” as “any foreign country that [Commerce] determines does not operate 
on market principles”). 
 53. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(18)(B) (2006). The list also includes the extent to which the 
currency of the foreign country is convertible into the currency of other countries; the 
extent to which wage rates in the foreign country are determined by free bargaining be-
tween labor and management; the extent to which joint ventures or other investments by 
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While normal value in NME cases is calculated differently from any of 
the three methods used in ME cases, the methodology is conceptually 
most similar to the constructed value method, in that Commerce seeks to 
cumulate the exporters costs to determine normal value.54 The essential 
difference between the two methodologies is that under the constructed-
value method, the costs will be calculated based on the price actually 
paid, but under the NME method the amount paid by the exporter gener-
ally55 has no bearing on the final dumping calculation.56 Instead, Com-
merce determines the component cost of inputs in a third country, and 
applies the resulting numbers as if they were the actual costs (“factors of 
production”) of the respective NME enterprise.57 
The NME valuation process is generally unfavorable to the exporter, 
compared to the valuation processes used for market-economy exporters, 
for two major reasons.58 First, the NME valuation method normally re-
sults in a higher dumping margin than its ME counterparts.59 Second, the 
                                                                                                                            
firms of other foreign countries are permitted in the foreign country; and such other fac-
tors as the administering authority considers appropriate. Id. 
 54. See U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Int’l Trade Administration, Import Administration, 
Antidumping (anti-dumping) / Countervailing Duty (CVD) Petition Counseling and 
Analysis Unit, Glossary,  http://ia.ita.doc.gov/pcp/pcp-index.html (defining constructed 
value as the sum of the “cost of materials and fabrication of the subject merchandise . . . 
selling, general, and administrative expenses and profit,” and similarly defining the fac-
tors of production approach as the sum of the hours of labor; the quantities of raw materi-
al; the amounts of energy; and the representative capital costs, although the costs are 
determined based on their “value . . . in a market economy country”). 
 55. This rule is subject to an exception. See text accompanying notes infra, p 14. 
 56. See 19 U.S.C. §1677b(c) (2006). Commerce is required to calculate the normal 
value of a product from an NME exporter by using surrogate values, called “factors of 
production,” derived from the cost of producing a similar product in an economically 
comparable ME country, id. at §1677b(c)(4). These surrogate values, rather than actual 
costs, are used as the NME exporter’s factors of production, which are then summed to 
ascertain normal value, id. at §1677b(c)(1). 
 57. 19 U.S.C. §1677b(c)(2) (2006). If Commerce finds that the available information 
is inadequate to determine normal value, it may use the market price of comparable mer-
chandise produced by an ME country. 
 58. Lantz, supra note 20, at 1004–05 (asserting that the use of NME valuation me-
thodology generally results in dumping margins that are higher than if the methods used 
for ME exporters had been applied, and explaining that the surrogate country approach 
has been criticized for being “unpredictable and arbitrary”). 
 59. For a thorough analysis of the higher rates typical of NME anti-dumping metho-
dology, see Bruce M. Mitchell & Ned H. Marshak, Comment on Behalf of the Govern-
ment of the People’s Republic of China, Ministry of Commerce, Response to Antidump-
ing Methodologies in Proceedings Involving Non-Market Economy Countries: Surrogate 
Country Selection and Separate Rates; Request for Comment, at 6 (April 20, 2007), 
http://ia.ita.doc.gov/download/ nme -surrogate-20070321/prc-mofcom-cmts-042007.pdf 
[hereinafter PRCMOC Comment] (demonstrating that over a period of 3 years the China-
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nature of the NME method makes it difficult for exporters to predict how 
the normal value will change during the annual reviews; as a result such 
exporters are unable to set their prices to the correct levels.60 
While it is widely accepted that the NME valuation method results in 
higher dumping margins than its market-economy equivalent,61 the 
unique methodology is premised on the idea that NME countries have 
distorted their internal markets to such an extent that it is impossible to 
determine the “real” price paid for goods and services.62 As a result, the 
ME valuation methods which rely on said “real prices” are necessarily 
inapplicable. 
2. NME Valuation and the Factors of Production 
The surrogate country valuation process acts by imposing certain costs, 
known as the factors of production.63 The process can be illustrated by 
conceptualizing a good produced in a non-market economy as a sum of 
its parts, each with a blank price tag. The price tag is then filled in using 
published prices from the surrogate country or countries, at which point 
the prices are cumulated to find normal value, similar to the constructed 
value method.64 
                                                                                                                            
wide rate was, on average, “13 times greater than the average market economy ‘all other’ 
rate”) (emphasis added); see also Bruce M. Mitchell & Ned H. Marshak, Comment on 
Behalf of the Government of the People’s Republic of China, Bureau of Fair Trade for 
Imports & Exports, Response to Separate Rates Practice in Antidumping Proceedings 
Involving Non-Market Economy Countries; Request for Comment, at 5–8 (June 1, 2004), 
http://ia.ita.doc.gov/download/nme-sep-rates/comments/boft-nme-sep-rates-cmt.pdf (pre-
senting multiple examples of how the average PRC rate is significantly higher than the 
average “all other” rate in ME countries for similar merchandise). 
 60. See Chutex June 25 Comment, supra note 46, at 5. 
 61. The view that surrogate-country methodology leads to higher dumping margins 
appears to be widely adopted by foreign exporters and even acknowledged by the U.S. 
government. See, e.g., U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, Report No. GAO-06-231, U.S. 
Chinese Relations: Eliminating Nonmarket Methodology Would Lower Anti-Dumping 
Duties for Some Chinese Companies (2006), available at http://www.gao.gov/htext 
/d06231.html; EMBASSY OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA, REPORT: US TRADE RULES UNFAIR (2005), available at http://www.china-
embassy.org/eng/zmgx/1/ t191208.htm. 
 62. PETERSON, supra note 9, at 99. 
 63. Id. at 65. 
 64. Id. The factors that Commerce considers when calculating normal value for an 
NME country include hours of labor required; quantities of raw minerals consumers; 
amount of energy and other utilities consumed; and representative capital costs. These 
factors are similar to the factors used in the constructed value approach, discussed supra 
note 40. 
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For better or for worse, this disconnect between actual cost and surro-
gate cost is absolute.65 Regardless of what kind of market the component 
materials were purchased from, whether or not the wages paid to the 
workers were competitive or not, and no matter the price paid for utilities 
to run the factories, Commerce attaches no significance to the expendi-
tures required to produce the exported goods.66 Instead, Commerce as-
signs values to these factors of production equal to their “cost” in the 
surrogate country.67 
One significant exception to this rule is if the NME respondent pur-
chased one of its factors of production directly from an ME producer, 
and paid in the currency of that ME country.68 In this case, Commerce 
will use the actual price paid instead of the surrogate value for this factor 
of production, even in cases where only a portion of the factor is pur-
chased according to the requirements.69 
3. Surrogate Country and Data Selection 
Selection of a surrogate country (like many processes within the NME 
anti-dumping framework) is controversial, heavily criticized and often 
difficult to justify.70 Commerce is guided by the conditions that the sur-
rogate country be “at a level of economic development comparable to 
that of the [NME] economy country” and also a “significant producer of 
the subject merchandise.”71 These provisions notwithstanding, Com-
merce’s efforts to find a suitable surrogate country are often frustrated by 
the lack of publicly available data or the unwillingness of the selected 
                                                                                                                            
 65. Subject to the exception explained infra Part 4. 
 66. 19 U.S.C. §1677b(c)(1) (2006). When merchandise is exported from a non-
market economy country and the available information does not permit the value of the 
merchandise to be determined pursuant to market economy valuation schemes, normal 
value is to be determined instead using the surrogate country factors of production ap-
proach, rather than using actual costs pursuant to the market economy approach. 
 67. Id. 
 68. See 19 C.F.R. § 351.408(c)(1) (2005). 
 69. Id. (“In those instances where a portion of the factor is purchased from a market 
economy supplier and the remainder from a nonmarket economy supplier, the Secretary 
normally will value the factor using the price paid to the market economy supplier”). 
 70. See Peter D. Ehrenhaft & Charlotte G. Meriwether, The Trade Agreements Act of 
1979: Small Aid for Trade?, 58 TUL. L. REV. 1107, 1128 (1984). 
 71. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(4)(A)-(B) (2006). Advocates for exporters would not have 
us forget that the statute predicates selecting an appropriate surrogate country on the con-
dition that Commerce finds that the available information does not permit Commerce to 
determine normal value pursuant to the market economy valuation methods. 19 U.S.C. § 
1677b(c)(1)(B). 
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country to cooperate with the investigation, leading to the selection of 
seemingly bizarre match-ups.72 
Although Commerce recently expressed its interest in reevaluating its 
methodology for selecting a surrogate country,73 the current practice is to 
prepare a list of several countries that Commerce finds to be potentially 
suitable as surrogates, and then solicit recommendations from interested 
parties on which country is most suitable.74 Nonetheless, Commerce ul-
timately has wide discretion in choosing the surrogate country.75 
With regard to the actual data that Commerce elects to use in determin-
ing the factors or production, the statute provides that that such data cho-
sen from the surrogate country be “the best available information.”76 If 
the adjective “best” begs the question “best for what purpose?” it is clear 
that Commerce would surely prefer to leave the answer to this question 
in the realm of bureaucratic discretion. However, it is becoming increa-
singly clear that Commerce is to gather this information for the purpose 
of calculating the dumping margin “as accurately as possible.”77 While 
this anchor creates a certain tension in the selection of acceptable surro-
gate country data, Commerce still retains a substantial amount of prover-
bial slack in settling on a data set.78 
                                                                                                                            
 72. See Ehrenhaft & Meriwether, supra note 70, at note 66 (discussing an investiga-
tion wherein India, Commerce’s first choice, refused to cooperate with the investigation, 
leading Commerce to choose Thailand as a surrogate for the PRC). 
 73. See generally May 25 Request, 72 Fed. Reg. 29, 302 (requesting comment on 
reevaluating its anti-dumping NME methodology for the PRC); October 25 Request, 72 
Fed. Reg. 60, 649 (requesting further comment). 
 74. See Antidumping Methodologies in Proceedings Involving Non–Market Econo-
my Countries: Surrogate Country Selection and Separate Rates, 72 FR 13, 246, 13, 246–
47 (Proposed March 21, 2007) [hereinafter Surrogate Proposal] (explaining Commerce’s 
process of “inviting comments” regarding surrogate countries from interest parties). For a 
criticism of this process, see PRCMOC Comment, supra note 59, at 3. 
 75. See Surrogate Proposal, supra note 74, at 13, 246 (“The Tariff Act…provides 
broad discretion in the selection of surrogate market economy countries.”). 
 76. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(1) (2006). 
 77. Allied Pac. Food (Dalian) Co. v. United States, 587 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1342 (Ct. 
Intl. Trade 2008) (citing Parkdale Int’l v. United States, 475 F.3d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 
2007)) (finding that Commerce failed to prove that its chosen data set was more reliable 
than other data offered by the respondent); see also Shakeproof Assembly Components v. 
United States, 268 F.3d 1376, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (reflecting that the purpose of the 
statutory provisions outlined in 19 U.S.C. §1677(b)(c)(1) determine margins accurately). 
 78. See Allied Pac. Food, supra note 77, at 1342 (asserting that while Commerce’s 
choice is to be guided by the purpose of calculating duties as broadly as possible, Com-
merce has been granted wide discretion in what it considers the best available informa-
tion). 
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4. Consequences of Surrogate Country Valuation 
Respondents from NME countries argue vociferously against the use 
of surrogate country factors of production in determining normal value.79 
NME exporters subject to this methodology argue that both surrogate 
country and data sets are selected in an arbitrary and even capricious 
manner.80 Unsurprisingly, criticism of the methodology reflects the wide-
ly held belief that using surrogate country values of production leads to 
higher normal value calculations, and thus higher penalties, than compa-
rable anti-dumping actions against ME exporters.81 
Commerce assumes that “all companies within the NME country are 
essentially operating units of a single, government-wide entity and 
should receive a single antidumping rate.”82 As a result, a firm with high 
input costs (and perhaps an equivalently-priced product) is going to re-
ceive a much higher dollar-penalty than a firm operating in a low-cost 
environment.83 
Although Commerce “presumes that all companies within the NME 
country are subject to government control,” it does allow certain firms 
the opportunity to receive individually calculated normal values (“sepa-
                                                                                                                            
 79. See Meikun Liu, Comment on Behalf of China Chamber of Commerce for Import 
& Export of Machinery and Electronic Products, Response to Antidumping Methodolo-
gies in Proceedings Involving Certain Non- Market Economies: Market-Oriented Enter-
prise; Request for Comment, at 6 (June 17, 2007), http://ia.ita.doc.gov/ download/nme-
moe/cccme-nme-moe-cmt-20070625.pdf [hereinafter CCCIEM June 17 Comment] (ar-
guing that Chinese respondents should receive market-economy valuation in dumping 
investigations). 
 80. See, e.g., Sungjoon Cho, A Dual Catastrophe of Protectionism, 25 NW. J. INT’L L. 
& BUS 315 , 328–32 (2005); Karen Halverson, China’s WTO Accession: Economic, Le-
gal and Political Implications, 27 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 319, 329–30 (2004). 
 81. See PRCMOC Comment, supra note 59, at 6. 
 82. IMPORT ADMINISTRATION, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, IMPORT 
ADMINISTRATION ANTIDUMPING MANUAL, Chapter 10, at 7 (Jan. 22, 1998), available at 
http://ia.ita.doc.gov/admanual/index.html (last updated Oct. 13, 2009) [hereinafter 
COMMERCE ANTIDUMPING MANUAL]. In accordance with Commerce’s disclaimer, this 
citation to the Manual is intended to illustrate the reasoning behind the practice of assign-
ing a single rate, and is not intended to establish that this is the practice currently adopted 
by Commerce. For a citation to satisfy the latter purpose, see Certain Tissue Paper Prod-
ucts and Certain Crepe Paper Products From the People’s Republic of China: Notice of 
Preliminary Determinations of Sales at Less Than Fair Value, Affirmative Preliminary 
Determination of Critical Circumstances and Postponement of Final Determination for 
Certain Tissue Paper Products, 69 Fed. Reg. 56, 407, 56, 412 (2004) [hereinafter Tissue 
Determination]. 
 83. See Tissue Determination, Fed. Reg. 56, 407 at 56, 412. (“it is the Department’s 
policy to assign all exporters of merchandise subject to investigation in an NME country 
this single [percentage] rate”). 
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rate rate status”) by proving an absence of governmental control.84 Be-
cause of the high administrative burden of conducting a separate rate sta-
tus analysis, Commerce tends to limit the number of entities that qualify, 
although its discretion is not unlimited.85 
The NME exporter is further disadvantaged by the relatively arbitrary 
and unpredictable nature of using factors of production to determine 
normal value. The implications of this unpredictability are best illustrated 
through comparison to the ME exporters. In ME cases, Commerce uses 
relatively predictable, consistent methods to calculate normal value, me-
thods that closely track either the producer’s sale price or its input cost.86 
This is important because it allows an ME respondent to either lower the 
price of its inputs, or “correctly price its goods in the U.S. market, there-
by avoiding an anti-dumping duty.”87 
Because the NME respondent is unable to predict which data set 
Commerce is going to use to calculate the factors of production for any 
given review, it is effectively constrained against calculating a “correct” 
price for its merchandise.88 Furthermore, because Commerce is using 
surrogate country inputs, it is “impossible for an NME producer to price 
its goods in the US market to avoid the imposition of antidumping du-
ties.”89 This lack of control over the valuation process is a source of fru-
stration to many NME respondents subject to anti-dumping duties, espe-
                                                                                                                            
 84. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Import Administration Policy Bulletin 05.1, Separate 
Rates Practice and Application of Combination Rates in Antidumping Investigations 
Involving Non-Market Economy Countries 1 (Apr. 5, 2005), available at 
http://ia.ita.doc.gov/policy/bull05-1.pdf (laying out the dual requirements of absence of 
de Jure (in law) control and de facto (in fact) control [hereinafter Separate Rates Policy 
Bulletin]. 
 85. Compare Longkou Haimeng Mach. Co. v. United States, 581 F. Supp. 2d 1344, 
1351–52 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2008) (holding that Commerce’s decision not to calculate com-
pany-specific dumping margin for plaintiff, a voluntary respondent, was in accordance 
with law. In this case Commerce’s decision not to grant mandatory respondent status to 
the plaintiff was based on part on the high administrative burden the analysis would re-
quire), with Zhejiang Native Produce & Animal By-Products Imp. & Exp. Corp. v. Unit-
ed States, 637 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1264 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2009) (holding that Commerce’s 
decision not to select voluntary respondent Zheijian for review was not in accordance 
with law. Distinguished Longkou by stating that the plaintiffs in that case had “conceded 
that Commerce had the authority to limit the number of mandatory respondents,” while in 
this case the plaintiffs alleged that Commerce had no such authority, given the small 
number of total respondents). 
 86. Laroski, supra note 49, at 395 (arguing that “market economy status adds accura-
cy to antidumping investigations and adds predictability”). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Charlene Barshefsky, Non-Market Economies in Transition and the US Anti-
dumping Law: Remarks on the Need for Reevaluation, 8 B.U. INT’L L.J. 373, 375 (1990). 
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cially when Commerce argues that the respondent should have known it 
was dumping.90 
D. The PRC’s Status under US Unfair-Trade Laws 
1. NME Status and the Market-Oriented Industry Test 
The PRC’s accession to the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) was 
completed on December 11, 2001.91 Following extensive negotiations, 
the PRC gained full membership, but the permanent WTO members 
forced the PRC to make several concessions in order to achieve this 
end.92 Concerned that the PRC’s abundance of cheap labor would make 
it impossible for certain low-skill domestic industries to compete with 
Chinese imports, the US and other developed countries insisted on cer-
tain protectionist measures.93 One such concession was that the US and 
other WTO member countries would be able to treat the PRC as an NME 
until 2016.94 
The immediate consequence of permitting member states to classify 
the PRC as an NME was that imposing surrogate-country valuation me-
thods on Chinese exporters became officially permitted in certain situa-
tions.95 A brief summary of NME valuation under the GATT rules is val-
uable at this point to illustrate how the PRC Accession Protocol inte-
racted with the rules that existed prior to the PRC Accession Protocol. 
An explanatory note to the 1947 GATT Agreement, which preceded 
the WTO, provided that valuation methods that did not utilize domestic 
prices may be necessary when the exporting country has “a complete or 
substantially complete monopoly of its trade and where all domestic 
                                                                                                                            
 90. See Zhejiang Native Produce & Animal By-Products Imp. & Exp. Corp. v. United 
States, 432 F.3d 1363, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (reh’g denied 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 4544) 
(agreeing with defendant respondent’s argument that it did not or should not have known 
it was dumping, despite Commerce’s assertion to the contrary). 
 91. Tracy Elizabeth Dardick, The US-China Safeguard Provision, the GATT, and 
Thinking Long Term, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 467, 474 (2005) (discussing the importance of the 
valuation process in anti-dumping investigations). 
 92. Id. at 472. 
 93. Id. at 473–74. 
 94. Id. at 472. 
 95. See World Trade Org., Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of 
China, pt. I, § 15(a)(ii), WT/L/432 (Nov. 23, 2001) (on file with author) (“The importing 
WTO Member may use a methodology that is not based on a strict comparison with do-
mestic prices or costs in China if the producers under investigation cannot clearly show 
that market economy conditions prevail”), available at 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN002123.pdf 
[hereinafter Accession Agreement]. 
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prices are fixed by the state.” 96 Although this seemingly strict “monopo-
ly” requirement would appear to refer exclusively to Soviet-style com-
mand economies, in practice it has not been applied quite so strictly.97 
This note was retained in the 1994 GATT Agreement (which led to the 
creation of the WTO),98 which explicitly provided that surrogate country 
valuation would be appropriate when actual costs are unemployable “be-
cause of the particular market situation [in the exporting country].”99 
Because the PRC’s economy is somewhere between a classic com-
mand-economy and a purely market-based economy,100 it is unclear 
whether WTO members would have legally been able to subject the PRC 
to the surrogate-country valuation method under the 1947 and 1994 
GATT rules. However, it is clear that the PRC Accession Protocol sets 
out guidelines for an NME status determination that differs from the tra-
ditional GATT protocol. The reference to a state “monopoly” did not 
survive.101 Instead, a member country is permitted to impose surrogate 
country valuation on Chinese respondents, unless such respondent can 
prove that the entire industry for that product operates under market-
economy conditions (“MOI Test”).102 
Although the revised GATT rules were finalized in 1994, Commerce 
had already employed a Market Oriented Industry (“MOI”) Test as far 
back as 1992.103 In order to escape surrogate-country valuation using the 
MOI test, the respondent in an anti-dumping investigation must prove 
                                                                                                                            
 96. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Annex I: Notes & Supplementary Pro-
visions, Art. VI, ¶ 1(2) (1947), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_03_e.htm#annexi [hereinafter GATT 
Annex 1] 
 97. See Gary N. Horlick & Shannon S. Shuman, Nonmarket Economy Trade and U.S. 
Antidumping/Countervailing Duty Laws, 18 INT’L LAW. 807, 807 n.57, 858 (1984). 
 98. See Marcia Don Harpaz, China and the WTO: New Kid on the Developing Bloc?, 
36 n.139 (Hebrew Univ. of Jerusalem Faculty of Law, Research Paper No. 2-07, 2007), 
available at www.ssrn.com/abstractid=961768. 
 99. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade 1994, pt. 1, art. 2, Determination of Dumping (1994), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/19-adp_01_e.htm. 
 100. See Daniel H. Johnson, Comment, East Seats West: China’s Accession to the 
World Trade Organization and the Rise of a Potent Threat to the North Carolina Furni-
ture Industry, 29 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 83, 92–93 (2003). 
 101. See generally Accession Agreement, supra note 95 (omitting reference to the 
GATT protocol or the “monopoly” requirement laid out in GATT Annex 1, supra note 
96). 
 102. Id. at pt. I, § 15(a). 
 103. See David Codevilla, Comment, Discouraging the Practice of What We Preach: 
Saarstahl I, Inland Steel and the Implementation of the Uruguay Round of GATT 1994, 3 
GEO. MASON INDEP. L. REV. 435, 466 n.190 (1995). 
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virtually no government involvement in industry prices or production; 
that the industry is marked by private or collective ownership that be-
haves as one in an ME country; and that producers pay market-
determined prices for all major inputs and almost all minor inputs.104 
According to Laroski, “the strict market-oriented industry test used by 
[Commerce] virtually guarantees that a market oriented industry will not 
be found.”105 As of this date, no respondent has been successful in its 
attempts to convince Commerce that its industry is market-oriented un-
der the terms of the test, and it appears unlikely that any industry will be 
able to qualify in the near future.106 
2. The “Double Standard” of Anti-Dumping & CVD Penalties 
While this Note focuses primarily on anti-dumping valuation issues, it 
is important to briefly discuss CVD law, another unfair trade mechanism. 
In Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, the court explained that the 
purpose of CVD law is “to offset the unfair competitive advantage that 
foreign producers would otherwise enjoy from export subsidies paid by 
their governments.”107 CVDs are relevant to the discussion of anti-
dumping NME valuation as applied to the PRC for two interrelated rea-
son. First, Commerce’s recent decision to employ CVD law against the 
PRC, an NME, apparently spurred the decision to reevaluate the valua-
tion method used against Chinese respondents in anti-dumping cases. 
More recently, the Court of International Trade expressed its own dissa-
tisfaction with the status quo approach, and ordered Commerce to either 
drop CVD penalties against the PRC or rethink its anti-dumping ap-
proach to take CVDs into account.108 
In 2007 Commerce reversed its policy of not applying CVDs against 
NMEs, in a case involving imports of paper from the PRC.109 In that 
case, the respondents argued that Commerce was precluded from apply-
ing CVDs to NME countries by virtue of Georgetown Steel, in which the 
Court of Appeals upheld the administrative decision to refrain from ap-
                                                                                                                            
 104. See May 25 Request, 72 Fed. Reg. 29, 302 at 29, 302–03. 
 105. Laroski, supra note 49, at 396. 
 106. See May 25 Request, 72 Fed. Reg. 29, 302 at 29, 303. 
 107. Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 1986) 
(citing Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443, 455–56 (1978)). 
 108. See GPX supra note 6. This case is discussed in detail in Section III.A.2, infra. 
 109. See Press Release, Dep’t of Commerce Office of Pub. Affairs, Commerce Applies 
Anti-Subsidy Law to China (March 30, 2007) (on file with author) available at 
http://www.commerce.gov/NewsRoom/PressReleases_FactSheets/PROD01_002950 
[hereinafter Commerce Press Release]. 
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plying CVDs to the PRC.110 However, Commerce maintained that it had 
imputed authority to apply CVD law to the PRC.111 
Prior to 2007, commentators, courts and assumedly the PRC had long 
believed that NME status guaranteed that CVD duties would not be im-
posed, which was consistent with Commerce statements made in the 
Federal Register.112 During this period Commerce maintained that the 
centrally controlled aspect of NME economies made government subsi-
dies immeasurable for purposes of calculating CVDs.113 In explaining the 
change in policy, Commerce stated that it had become possible to identi-
fy and measure government subsidies due to increasingly market-
oriented nature of the PRC’s economy.114 
This was the first time that the US had imposed CVDs on an NME,115 
but recent development notwithstanding, it appears to have become the 
rule rather than the exception.116 Imposing CVDs on NME countries is 
not explicitly precluded by WTO regulations.117 However, since the poli-
                                                                                                                            
 110. See Memorandum from Stephen J. Claeys, Deputy Director, Import Administra-
tion, to David M. Spooner, Assistant Secretary for Import Administration, regarding Is-
sues and Decision for the Final Determination in the Countervailing Duty Investigation of 
Coated Free Sheet from the People’s Republic of China, at 16–17 (Oct. 17, 2007), 
http://ia.ita.doc.gov/frn/summary/PRC/E7-21046-1.pdf [hereinafter Coated Free Sheet 
Final Determination] (“The [respondent] argues that [Commerce] does not have the au-
thority to apply the CVD law to China as long as the Department continues to designate 
China as a nonmarket economy, , , In support, [petitioner] points to . . . [Georgtown 
Steel]”). 
 111. Id. at 19–20.  
 112. See Countervailing Duties, 63 Fed. Reg. 65, 348, 65, 360 (Dep’t Commerce Nov. 
25, 1998). 
 113. See Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Czechoslovakia: Final Negative Countervailing 
Duty Determination, 49 Fed. Reg. 19, 370, 19, 371-19, 372 (Dep’t Commerce May 7, 
1984). 
 114. See Georgetown Steel Memorandum, supra note 4, at 10. 
 115. See Commerce Press Release, supra note 109 (“This is the first time countervail-
ing duties will be imposed on imports from a non-market economy.”). However, for a 
discussion on the first CVD investigation against an NME, see Harris, infra note 257. 
 116. See, e.g., Kathleen Canon, U.S. PC Strand Industry Files Antidumping and Coun-
tervailing Duty Cases Against China, REUTERS, May 27, 2009, at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/idUS195758+27-May-2009+PRN20090527 
(announcing the domestic producers of steel wire filed anti-dumping and CVD petitions 
against the same PRC respondent); Department of Commerce, Int’l Trade Comm., Fact 
Sheet, available at http://ia.ita.doc.gov/download/factsheets/factsheet-prc-drill-pipe-init-
012110.pdf; but cf. GPX, supra note 6, at 3 (holding that the application of both CVDs 
and NME anti-dumping penalties in their current form to PRC producers was impermiss-
ible). 
 117. See Loren Yager, Director, International Affairs and Trade, U.S. Government 
Accountability Office GAO-06-608T, Testimony Before the U.S.-China Economic and 
Security Review Commission, at 2 (April 4, 2006). 
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cy-shift, the Chinese government has been lobbying heavily for so-called 
equal treatment: either its exporters receive the benefit of ME valuation 
methods under anti-dumping laws, or CVD laws not apply.118 
Currently, Chinese exporters may be subject to unfavorable status un-
der both CVD and anti-dumping laws.119 On one hand, the Chinese 
economy has liberalized to the point where Commerce believes govern-
ment subsidies have become measurable and thus subject to CVD ana-
lyses.120 At the same time, Commerce does not believe the Chinese 
economy has developed to the point where ME valuation is appropri-
ate.121 Further, no individual industry can establish that it is operating 
entirely under free-market principles in order to pass the MOI test and 
receive the benefit of the ME valuation method.122 At this point in time 
the PRC is the only country to receive NME status per anti-dumping 
laws and ME status per CVD policy.123 
In September 2009, the Court of International Trade effectively man-
dated that Commerce do something about its failure to address its appli-
cation of anti-dumping procedures against the PRC in light of the market 
liberalization impliedly recognized by the decision to apply CVDs to 
Chinese exporters.124 The reasoning behind this holding—that NME anti-
dumping valuation plus CVD duties effectively amount to “double 
counting”125—speaks to both the need for, and the legality of, a new val-
                                                                                                                            
 118. See William H. Barringer, Comment on Behalf of China Chamber of Commerce 
of Minerals, Metals and Chemical Imports and Exporters, Response to Antidumping 
Methodologies in Proceedings Involving Certain Non- Market Economies: Market-
Oriented Enterprise; Request for Comment, at 7–8 (June 25, 2009), http://ia.ita.doc. 
gov/download/nme-moe/cccmc-nme-moe-cmt-20070625.pdf [hereinafter CCCMMC 
June 25 Comment]. Although demonstrating frustration for being penalized under both 
anti-dumping and CVD law, Chinese respondents are generally more inclined to advocate 
for abolition of NME status than to argue for elimination of CVD duties, id. 
 119. Subject to the discussion of GPX, infra Section III.A.2. 
 120. See Coated Free Sheet Paper From the People’s Republic of China: Amended 
Preliminary Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. 17, 484, 17, 
486 (Dep’t Commerce Apr. 9, 2007). 
 121. See Georgetown Steel Memorandum, supra note 4, at 7. 
 122. See May 25 Request, 72 Fed. Reg. 29, 302 at 29, 303. 
 123. See Polyethylene Retail Carrier Bags From the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: 
Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigation and Request for Public Comment on the 
Application of the Countervailing Duty Law to Imports From the Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam, 74 FR 19064, 19067 (Dep’t of Commerce April 27, 2009). 
 124. See GPX, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 1288–89; see also Yager, supra note 117, at 2 
(“[a]bsent a clear congressional grant of authority, [applying CVDs to an NME] could be 
challenged in court, with uncertain results”). 
 125. GPX, 745 F. Supp. 2d at 1235. 
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uation approach for anti-dumping investigations against Chinese coun-
tries, and will be discussed more fully in section III of this Note. 
II. AN ECONOMY IN TRANSITION: THE STATE OF THE PRC’S MARKETS 
AND A SEARCH FOR A NEW VALUATION APPROACH 
A. The Transitional State of the PRC’s Economy 
Cognizant of the competitive disadvantage its exporters suffer due to 
NME classification, the Government of the PRC supported a request 
made by Chinese respondents in an anti-dumping case that Commerce 
review the PRC’s status as an NME country.126 In response, Commerce 
drafted two memoranda in which it discussed in detail whether the PRC 
could be considered an ME country.127 
In the Georgetown Steel Memorandum, which effectively summarized 
the two memoranda,128 Commerce found that the PRC had implemented 
significant economic reforms since the early 1990’s, and that its econo-
my was far more “flexible” than the soviet-style economies for which the 
NME valuation methods were formulated.129 In contrast to those econo-
mies, the PRC has eliminated price controls on most products; allows 
employers to set wages; permits a certain degree of individual entrepre-
neurship; and extends foreign trading rights to Foreign-Invested Enter-
prises.130 Commerce summarized the PRC’s economy as “one in which 
constrained market mechanisms operate alongside (and sometimes, in 
spite of) government plans.”131 
Unfortunately for the respondent in that case, and for Chinese expor-
ters in general, Commerce found that those alluded-to government plans 
                                                                                                                            
 126. See Georgetown Steel Memorandum, supra note 4, at 2. 
 127. See generally Memorandum from Shauna Lee-Alaia et al., Office of Policy, Im-
port Adminstration, to David M. Spooner, Assistant Sec’y, Import Administration, The 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) Status as a Non-Market Economy (NME) (May 15, 
2006), http://ia.ita.doc.gov/download/prc-nme-status/prc-nme-status-memo.pdf [hereinaf-
ter May 15 Memorandum] (evaluating whether the PRC’s economy had graduated to ME 
status); Memorandum from Shauna Lee-Alaia ET AL., Office of Policy, Import Adminis-
tration, to David M. Spooner, Assistant Sec’y, Import Administration Antidumping Duty 
Investigation of Certain Lined Paper Products from the People’s Republic of China 
(“China”)- China’s status as a non-market economy (“NME”) (Aug. 30, 2006), 
http://www.docinweb.com/Lined_Paper_Products_from_the_People%27s_Republic_of_
China_61356#download_link [hereinafter August 30 Memorandum] (evaluating in great 
detail whether China’s economy had graduated to ME status). 
 128. Georgetown Steel Memorandum, supra note 4, at 3 n.1. 
 129. Id. at 4. 
 130. Id. at 5–7. 
 131. Id. at 9. 
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in fact constrained the Chinese market to a legally determinative ex-
tent.132 In particular, the May 15 Memorandum stated that the Chinese 
government continued to exert a great deal of control over the banking 
sector, which was particularly significant given that one of the factors for 
an NME determination is the extent of government control over the allo-
cation of resources.133 The August 30 Memorandum additionally hig-
hlighted the extent of government control over currency value,134 labor 
mobility,135 and the undeveloped state of property rights136 as evidence 
that the PRC was not yet a ME under its interpretation of the Tariff Act 
requirements. 
Based on these findings, Commerce reached the conclusion that due to 
the “limited extent to which market forces and institutional reform have 
taken root in critical sectors of the [PRC’s] economy . . . the [PRC] 
should therefore continue to be considered an NME country for purposes 
of U.S. antidumping law.”137 In answer to the PRC’s request that it be 
allowed to use ME country valuation methods in anti-dumping investiga-
tions, Commerce stated, “market forces in the [PRC] are not yet suffi-
ciently developed to permit the use of prices and costs in that country for 
purposes of the Department’s dumping analysis.”138 
B. A Reconsideration of NME Valuation Methods for Chinese Respon-
dents 
1. Commerce’s Requests for Comment 
The astute reader will have noticed the adverbial form of the word 
“yet,” used above, referring to the (in)appropriateness of ME valuation 
                                                                                                                            
 132. Coated Free Sheet Final Determination, supra note 110, at 19–20. 
 133. May 15 Memorandum, supra note 127, at 3. Given the investment-driven nature 
of the PRC’s economy, the May 15 Memorandum attached extra significance to govern-
ment control of the financial sector. 
 134. See August 30 Memorandum, supra note 127, at 13 (concluding that although the 
renminbi was not yet market-based, it was not “completely insulated from market 
forces”). Although the PRC is currently pegging the value of the renminbi to that of the 
dollar, see Michael Pettis, What the [PRC] Cannot Do With Its Reserves (Feb. 22, 2010), 
http:// http://mpettis.com/2010/02/what-the-pboc-cannot-do-with-its-reserves, I posit that 
this imbalance is best addressed by the executive branch of government, and that the 
legislative and judicial branches should respectfully defer. 
 135. Id. at 22 (“[R]estrictions on labor mobility serve to inhibit and guide workforce 
flows and seriously distort the supply side of the labor market”). 
 136. Id. at 46 (concluding that property rights in the PRC “remain poorly defined and 
weakly enforced”). 
 137. May 15 Memorandum, supra note 127, at 8–9. 
 138. August 30 Memorandum, supra note 127, at 82. 
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methods for Chinese exports in anti-dumping investigations. In the nega-
tive, the adverbial “yet” signifies that the speaker is expecting something 
to happen.139 The literalist may protest that there is no error, as the valua-
tion method is expected to change in 2016.140 However, Commerce has 
recently demonstrated a more immediate willingness to re-evaluate the 
valuation procedures for Chinese companies in anti-dumping investiga-
tions, although it has not yet implemented any changes. 
In May of 2007 Commerce began to publicly solicit for suggestions on 
modifying its approach to calculating normal value for individual Chi-
nese respondents.141 Acknowledging the Georgetown Steel Memoran-
dum, the May 25th request stated: 
The evolution of the PRC’s economy together with the features and 
characteristics of the PRC’s present-day economy…suggest that mod-
ification of some aspects of the Department’s current NME antidump-
ing policy and practice with regard to the PRC may be warranted, such 
as the conditions under which the Department might grant an individual 
respondent in the PRC market-economy treatment in some or all re-
spects.142 
Although commentators such as Lantz had been advocating an ap-
proach that focused on individual enterprises since the 1990’s,143 this was 
the first time Commerce had raised the possibility of an MOE analysis.144 
The incentive for proposing the MOE test now apparently stemmed in 
part from Commerce’s admission that no Chinese industry had met the 
high standard required to pass the MOI test145 and also in part from the 
                                                                                                                            
 139. RAYMOND MURPHY, ENGLISH GRAMMAR IN USE: A SELF-STUDY REFERENCE AND 
PRACTICE BOOK FOR INTERMEDIATE STUDENTS OF ENGLISH 222 (2004). True purveyors 
of grammatical nuance may have also noticed the continual use of the word “continue,” 
this time in reference to the PRC’s nominal status as an NME. One may assume an 
equivalent connotation. 
 140. 2016 is the date at which the PRC will become an ME under the terms of the 
Accession Agreement. See Accession Agreement, supra note 95, at pt. I, § 15(d). 
 141. See May 25 Request, 72 Fed. Reg. 29, 302 at 29, 302. 
 142. Id. at 29, 303 (emphasis added). 
 143. Lantz, supra note 20, at 1049 (arguing that such an individualized approach 
would be “superior,” and also stating rather prophetically that such a test would forestall 
the undesirable possibility that an NME respondent would be subject to both NME valua-
tion for Ad purposes and ME liability for CVD purposes). 
 144. The short-lived “bubbles-of-capitalism” approach attempted briefly to address 
this type of enterprise, but was ultimately never utilized. This approach will be discussed 
in Section III.B.1, infra. 
 145. May 25 Request, 72 Fed. Reg. 29, 302 at 29, 302. 
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fact that it the PRC’s economy had evolved to the point where govern-
ment subsidies could be “identified and measured.”146 
In its May 25th Request, Commerce asked interested parties to respond 
to two questions. Initially, how should Commerce identify individual 
Chinese respondents that are operating under market conditions, if at all? 
In posing this question, the May 25th Request emphasized an identifica-
tion of the particular “conditions” under which the ME treatment might 
be warranted.147 Then, once identified, to what extent should Commerce 
rely on the MOE’s own costs to determine normal value?148 Regarding 
this second question, Commerce was particularly concerned with costs 
that were “inextricably linked” to the factors that the Georgetown Steel 
Memorandum identified as still being subject to Chinese government 
control.149 
After receiving initial responses, Commerce published a second re-
quest for comment.150 The October 25th request posed new question in 
response to certain arguments made in the initial responses, arguments 
addressed in detail in part C of this section. First, does Commerce have 
the legal authority to administer an MOE test?151 Second, would an MOE 
test be administratively feasible, particularly considering the interconnec-
tedness of prices within an economy?152 And finally, Commerce asked 
again for comment addressing the extent to which an MOE’s own prices 
and costs could be utilized, specifically those costs most exposed to “ma-
croeconomic NME distortions.”153 
For the purposes of this Note, I will attempt to summarize the positions 
argued in the responses in regard to three questions. First, is an MOE test 
legal? That is, does Commerce have the statutory authority to adopt an 
MOE test, and would such a test be compatible with our WTO obliga-
                                                                                                                            
 146. Id. While CVDs were not explicitly mentioned in the May 25th Request, Com-
merce referred repeatedly to the Georgetown Steel Memorandum, which had posited the 
applicability of CVDs as a direct consequences of that fact that government benefits 
could be identified and measured. 
 147. Id. at 29, 303. 
 148. A valuation method that took an MOE’s own costs into consideration would like-
ly resemble the ME Constructed Value method, although this term is not used explicitly 
in the May 25th Request. See generally May 25 Request, 72 Fed. Reg. 29, 302. 
 149. See May 25 Request, 72 Fed. Reg. 29, 302 at 29, 303 (the “inextricably linked” 
inputs identified were labor, land and capital). 
 150. See generally October 25 Request, 72 Fed. Reg. 60, 649 (asking for further com-
ment on the proposed MOE test). 
 151. Id. at 60, 650. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. The inputs that were given as “inextricable linked” were the same as the ones 
mentioned in the May 25 Request, 72 Fed. Reg. 29, 302, namely, labor, land and capital. 
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tions. As you will see, many of the respondents argue that not only is an 
MOE test legal, but in fact it is necessary. Second, assuming that an 
MOE test is legal, which companies qualify for it, and how would those 
companies be identified? Finally, after identifying an MOE, the question 
becomes how to calculate normal value, that is, for what inputs may 
Commerce depart from traditional NME valuation methods, and on what 
alternate methods should it rely? 
2. Responses to Commerce’s Request for Comment: A Summary 
a. Legality of a Market-Oriented Enterprise Test 
Commerce received almost 40 responses the May 25th request154 and 
almost 30 for the October 25th request,155 although there was a fair 
amount of overlap in terms of participants.156 Arguments around legality 
generally centered around 19 U.S.C. 1677 and 1677b (the “Tariff Act”), 
as well as the accession act granting the PRC admission to the WTO (the 
“Accession Act”). 
The responses in favor of an MOE test (“Responses in Favor”) were 
adamant in their assertion that the Tariff Act language did not create a 
barrier to the MOE test. One noteworthy response made the point that the 
“two-step statutory analysis [of 19 U.S.C. 1677b(c)(1)] anticipates that 
the Department may find it appropriate to use its standard methodology 
for calculating normal value even in proceedings involving an NME 
country.”157 For readers possessing neither a photographic memory nor 
encyclopedic knowledge of trade law, 19 U.S.C. 1677b(c)(1) outlines 
two requirements that must be in order to impose NME valuation me-
thods in anti-dumping investigations: first, that the merchandise subject 
to the anti-dumping investigation be exported from an NME, and second, 
                                                                                                                            
 154. A complete list of the May 25th responses is available at 
http://ia.ita.doc.gov/download/nme-moe/nme-moe-cmt-20070625-index.html. 
 155. A complete list of the October 25th responses is available at 
http://ia.ita.doc.gov/download/nme-moe/comments-20071210/nme-moe-cmt-20071210-
index.html. 
 156. Of the 29 Second-Round Responses received, 13 had also been First-Round Res-
ponses. See http://ia.ita.doc.gov/download/nme-moe/nme-moe-cmt-20070625-
index.html. 
 157. Brenda A. Jacobs, Comment on Behalf of Chutex Group, Response to Antidump-
ing Methodologies in Proceedings Involving Certain Non- Market Economies: Market-
Oriented Enterprise; Request for Comment, at 2 (December 10, 2007), 
http://ia.ita.doc.gov/download/nme-moe/comments-20071210/chutex-nme-moe-cmt-
20071210.pdf [hereinafter Chutex December 10 Comment]. 
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that the available information does not permit standard ME methods of 
valuation must be met.158 
The first prong of the above test is rather straightforward. However, it 
is the second prong that the Responses in Favor are fixated upon, howev-
er painfully. As the Chutex December 10 Comment clearly enunciates, 
“the mere fact that an antidumping proceeding involves an NME is insuf-
ficient reason for the Department to deviate from the standard [ME] me-
thodology for calculating normal value.”159 This implicitly implies that 
the state of the PRC’s economy does indeed allow the application of ME 
methods to determine the normal value of merchandise. In fact, this in-
terpretation extends an MOE test, which would hypothetically account 
for this situation, beyond permissible and into the rigid realm of neces-
sary, considering that Commerce would actually be precluded from using 
NME methodology if the available information made certain ME me-
thods applicable. 
In case its statutory interpretation is in doubt, the Chutex December 10 
Comment pointed to the legislative history of the 1988 trade act that 
amended the antidumping statute.160 Read in part, the history stipulates 
that “[i]f information submitted by a non-market economy country to the 
Department permits foreign market value to be determined accurately 
using the normal [ME] methodology, then the committee expects such 
methodology to be used by the department.”161 
Statutory provisions aside, various responses pointed out that Com-
merce enjoys an interpretive flexibility that allows it to deviate from the 
industry-wide surrogate value method.162 Put less formally, Commerce 
already tweaks the NME valuation approach to account for certain mar-
ket-oriented forces by allowing certain respondents the opportunity to 
gain separate rate status by showing a lack of government control, and 
also by valuing certain inputs purchased directly from market-economy 
                                                                                                                            
 158. See 19 U.S.C. 1677b(c)(1) (2006). 
 159. Chutex December 10 Comment, supra note 157, at 2. 
 160. Id. at 3. 
 161. Id. at 3–4 (citing S. Rep. No. 100-71, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 108 (1987)). 
 162. Id. at 4–5; see also Douglas J. Heffner & Rick Johnson , Comment on Behalf of 
J.C. Penney, Response to Antidumping Methodologies in Proceedings Involving Certain 
Non-Market Economies: Market-Oriented Enterprise; Request for Comment, at 4 (De-
cember 10, 2007), http://ia.ita.doc.gov/download/nme-moe/comments-
20071210/jcpenney-nme-moe-cmt-20071210.pdf [hereinafter J.C. Penney December 10 
Comment] (pointing out that the MOI test itself would not be legal under an interpreta-
tion of [19 U.S.C. 1677b] that precluded ME methodology from being applied in an 
NME setting). 
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countries at market price.163 Because these practices are currently ac-
cepted as legal interpretations of statutory authority, it seems unlikely 
that an MOE test would be impermissible. 
The responses that advocated against an MOE test (the “Responses 
Against”) tended to emphasize both the PRC WTO Accession Agree-
ment and also 19 U.S.C. §1677b(c)(1). Citing the Tariff Act, the Ameri-
can Furniture June 25th Comment argues that 19 U.S.C. §1677b(c)(1) 
precludes an MOE test by defining NMEs as countries where ME me-
thodologies are inapplicable, therefore “when the exporting country is 
designated a [NME], the Department must use the [NME] methodolo-
gy.”164 However, while such circular logic is questionable, a closer read-
ing of the statute reveals that this argument effectively jumps from the 
term “Nonmarket economy countries” to the factors of production ap-
proach at the end of the sentence, effectively skipping the two-prong test 
discussed above.165 
A stronger argument is that neither the Accession Agreement nor the 
Tariff Act contemplates individual entities receiving special status. A 
comment arguing that the language in Accession Agreement precludes 
an MOE test points out that “while the [Accession Agreement] provides 
for determinations as to whether Chinese industries warrant market 
economy treatment, there is no such provision [that this would be done 
for individual companies].”166 Similarly, the ICL June 25th Comment ar-
                                                                                                                            
 163. See Harry Lee, Comment on Behalf of Textile Counsel of Hong Kong, Response 
to Antidumping Methodologies in Proceedings Involving Certain Non- Market Econo-
mies: Market-Oriented Enterprise; Request for Comment, at 3–4 (December 10, 2007), 
http://ia.ita.doc.gov/download/nme-moe/comments-20071210/tchk-nme-moe-cmt-
20071210.pdf [hereinafter Textile Counsel December 10 Comment] (“Other practices 
adopted by [Commerce] reinforce the principle that [Commerce] may deviate from its 
alternative NME methodology where warranted”). 
 164. See Joseph W. Dorn, et al., Comment on Behalf of American Furniture Manufac-
turers Committee for Legal Trade et al., Response to Antidumping Methodologies in 
Proceedings Involving Certain Non- Market Economies: Market-Oriented Enterprise; 
Request for Comment, at 2–3 (June 25, 2007), http://ia.ita.doc.gov/download/nme-
moe/king-spalding-nme-moe-cmt-20070625.pdf [hereinafter American Furniture June 25 
Comment] The exact statutory language is, “the valuation of the factors of production 
shall be based on the best available information regarding the values of such factors in a 
market economy country or countries considered to be appropriate by the administering 
authority,” 19 U.S.C. 1677b(c)(1) (2006). 
 165. See 19 U.S.C. 1677b(c) (2006). 
 166. Robert E. Lighthizer et al., Comment on Behalf of United States Steel Corpora-
tion, Response to Antidumping Methodologies in Proceedings Involving Certain Non- 
Market Economies: Market-Oriented Enterprise; Request for Comment, at 2 (June 25, 
2007), http://ia.ita.doc.gov/download/nme-moe/us-steel-nme-moe-cmt-20070625.pdf 
[hereinafter U.S. Steel June 25 Comment]. 
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gued that the NME methodology outlined by the Tariff Act at 19 U.S.C. 
1677b, “applies to exports from ‘a nonmarket economy,’ not to exports 
of a particular enterprise.”167 
While there is nothing factually wrong with these arguments, they do 
not address the fact that Commerce already applies special rules to indi-
vidual respondents, as several of the Responses in Favor were quick to 
point out.168 
b. Identifying a Market-Oriented Enterprise 
Most of the Responses in Favor shared one prominent stipulation re-
garding identification: the identification portion of the test should not be 
impossible to pass.169 These concerns arose from the fact that “no indus-
try has met the MOI standard in the fifteen years since this test was in-
troduced by the Department.”170 
Although virtually all of the Responses in Favor cited specific criteria 
that Commerce could use to help it identify whether an individual enter-
prise was sufficiently market-oriented, the responses trifurcated on 
whether the identification criteria should be modeled more on the MOI 
test, on the Separate-Rates Test, or on the NME test.171 
                                                                                                                            
 167. James R. Cannon, Jr., Comment on Behalf of ICL Performance Products, LP and 
Innophos, Response to Antidumping Methodologies in Proceedings Involving Certain 
Non- Market Economies: Market-Oriented Enterprise; Request for Comment, at 4 (June 
25, 2007), http://ia.ita.doc.gov/download/nme-moe/icl-innophos-nme-moe-cmt-
20070625.pdf [hereinafter ICL June 25 Comment] (citing 19 U.S.C. 1677b(c)). 
 168. See Textile Counsel December 10 Comment, supra note 163, at 3–4. 
 169. See Brenda Jacobs, Comment on Behalf of Textile Counsel of Hong Kong, Re-
sponse to Antidumping Methodologies in Proceedings Involving Certain Non-Market 
Economies: Market-Oriented Enterprise; Request for Comment, at 6–7 (June 25, 2007), 
http://ia.ita.doc.gov/download/nme-moe/tchk-nme-moe-cmt-20070625.pdf [hereinafter 
Textile Counsel June 25 Comment] (suggesting that the MOE test employ criteria “that 
may be realistically met by companies that have embraced market principles,” and “avoid 
the problems that have plagued application of the MOI test”). 
 170. Id. at 6. 
 171. Compare Chutex December 10th Comment, supra note 157, at 7–8 (arguing that 
unlike the NME test, the Separate-Rate Test was created with individual enterprises in 
mind, and thus would reduce the administrative costs of implementing an MOE test based 
on its design), with Wang Xuehua & Bao Xiaobo , Comment on Behalf of Huanzhong & 
Partners, Response to Antidumping Methodologies in Proceedings Involving Certain 
Non- Market Economies: Market-Oriented Enterprise; Request for Comment, at 3 (De-
cember 10, 2007), http://ia.ita.doc.gov/ download/nme-moe/comments-20071210/bhp-
nme-moe-cmt-20071210.pdf [hereinafter Huanzhong December 10 Comment] (arguing 
that some of the factors listed in U.S.C. 1677(18)(B) that constitute the NME test “appear 
to be more suitable for individual companies rather than for a country”). 
910 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 35:3 
Despite the failure of the MOI test, several of the Responses in Favor 
urged Commerce to borrow certain aspects of the MOI test to identify 
individual companies that may be considered market oriented.172 In addi-
tion to the general requirements of the MOI test, these responses sug-
gested that Commerce consider whether the firm utilizes generally ac-
cepted accounting principles, adheres to regularized depreciation and 
payment systems, and are not protected from bankruptcy or afforded debt 
relief from the government.173 
In fact, such a test would be similar to one already utilized by the Eu-
ropean Union.174 According to the Jurisno June 20 Comment, the Euro-
pean Community Regulations identify 5 criteria for granting ME treat-
ment to individual respondents.175 These criteria include whether pricing 
and related decisions are made without State interference; whether ac-
counting records are in line with international accounting standards; 
whether the production costs and financial situations are not subject to 
significant distortions, whether the firms are subject to reliable bankrupt-
cy and property laws; and exchange rate conversions being carried out at 
the market rate.176 
Another group of Responses in Favor urged Commerce to identify 
MOEs using criteria already employed in the separate-rate test.177 One 
response explained, “the separate rate test serves as the appropriate boi-
lerplate for developing an MOE test because the purpose of the separate 
rate test is the same as the test for determining an MOE – i.e., determin-
                                                                                                                            
 172. See, e.g., Eric J. Jiang & Aimin Sun, Comment on Behalf of Jurisno Law group, 
Response to Antidumping Methodologies in Proceedings Involving Certain Non- Market 
Economies: Market-Oriented Enterprise; Request for Comment, at 6 (June 20, 2007), 
http://ia.ita.doc.gov/download/nme-moe/jurisino-nme-moe-cmt-20070625.pdf [hereinaf-
ter Jurisno June 20 Comment] (suggesting that Commerce initially base its MOE test on 
the conditions developed for the MOI test, and also consider the European Union ap-
proach); Textile Counsel June 25 Comment, supra note 169, at 7 (suggesting that the 
MOI criteria be applied to an MOE test “in a more practical manner”). 
 173. Jurisno June 20 Comment, supra note 172, at 3. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at 3. 
 176. Id. at 3 (citing Council Regulation (EC) No 905/98 of 27 April 1998 amending 
Regulation (EC) No 384/96 on Protection Against Dumped Imports From Countries Not 
Members of the European Community). 
 177. Douglas J. Heffner & Rick Johnson, Comment on Behalf of J.C. Penney, Re-
sponse to Antidumping Methodologies in Proceedings Involving Certain Non- Market 
Economies: Market-Oriented Enterprise; Request for Comment, at 3–4 (June 25, 2007), 
http://ia.ita.doc.gov/download/nme-moe/jcpenney-nme-moe-cmt-20070625.pdf [herei-
nafter J.C. Penney June 25 Comment]. For a comprehensive list of separate-rate test fac-
tors, see Separate Rates Policy Bulletin, supra note 84, at 2. 
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ing absence of government control.”178 In principal such a test would 
“expand the focus of the analysis from just the export operations to the 
respondent’s entire operations—both manufacturing and export activi-
ties.”179 
Conceptually similar to the separate-rate test approach was the mutual-
ly compatible suggestion that Commerce establish a shifting burden of 
proof depending on the classification of the respondent. As one response 
put it, “a hierarchy could be constructed under which state owned com-
panies are required to answer certain questions . . . not required of pri-
vately owned companies.”180 Analogously, SOEs could be presumed in-
eligible for MOE treatment, while wholly-foreign-investment enterprises 
(“WFIE”) would be granted MOE status prima-facie, with private Chi-
nese-owned companies falling somewhere in the middle.181 
Finally, the Huanzhong December 10 Comment argued that the factors 
used for the determination of the market-economy status of a country 
“could be adapted for individual companies.”182 In particular, they argue 
that it would be feasible to determine on an individual basis whether the 
company set wage rates or not and whether the government or the com-
pany controlled the production means or made decisions regarding out-
put.183 
Less subtle than the above suggestions were the responses made on 
behalf of various Chinese Chambers of Commerce. In forceful, immode-
rate terms, these responses argued, “that an absolute majority of Chinese 
enterprises are operate under market-economy environment [sic],”184 and 
                                                                                                                            
 178. Philippe M. Bruno, Comment on Behalf of Baosteel Group Corp., et al., Response 
to Antidumping Methodologies in Proceedings Involving Certain Non-Market Econo-
mies: Market-Oriented Enterprise; Request for Comment, at 3–4 (June 25, 2007), 
http://ia.ita.doc.gov/download/nme-moe/baosteel-nme-moe-cmt-20070625.pdf [hereinaf-
ter Baosteel June 25 Comment]. 
 179. Id. at 5. 
 180. CCCMMC June 25 Comment, supra note 118, at 17–18. 
 181. See Richard Malish et al., Comment on Behalf of Cheng Meng Furniture, Re-
sponse to Antidumping Methodologies in Proceedings Involving Certain Non-Market 
Economies: Market-Oriented Enterprise; Request for Comment, at 7–9 (June 21, 2007), 
http://ia.ita.doc.gov/download/nme-moe/cmf-nme-moe-cmt-20070625.pdf [hereinafter 
Cheng Meng June 25 Comment] (arguing that Commerce should “distinguish between” 
state-owned enterprises and privately owned companies for purposes of an MOE test). 
 182. Huanzhong December 10 Comment, supra note 171, at 3. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Wang Hangjiang, Comment on Behalf of China Chamber of Commerce for Im-
port & Export of Machinery & Electric Products, Response to Antidumping Methodolo-
gies in Proceedings Involving Certain Non- Market Economies: Market-Oriented Enter-
prise; Request for Comment, at 2 (December 10, 2007), http://ia.ita.doc.gov/ down-
912 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 35:3 
“currently, the vast majority of Chinese industries have met the . . . MOE 
criteria.”185 Responding specifically to administrative feasibility, the 
Chamber of Commerce responses argue across the board that most pri-
vate-owned firms operating completely under “a fair and liberal market 
economy,”186 with the implication that identification of those firms 
should be fairly straightforward.  
Many of the Responses Against made the equally hard-line assertion 
that “economy-wide distortions in the PRC . . . affect all Chinese respon-
dents,” and that “accordingly, it would be inappropriate for the Depart-
ment to find that any Chinese respondent is entitled to [MOE] treat-
ment.”187 Thus according to this argument, the problem with identifying 
NMEs is the fact that none exist. 
A better argument was that determining whether Chinese enterprises 
are market-oriented would be administratively unfeasible.188 Based on 
the premise that non-market distortions permeate the Chinese economy, 
“any attempt to demonstrate how an individual Chinese company could 
be shown to be so insulated [against non-market distortions] would be 
extremely complicated and excessively time-consuming.”189 
On a similar note, the ICL December 10 Comment raised the question 
of where Commerce would obtain its data to make an MOE determina-
tion. It stated, “the crux of the problem is not whether market-based pric-
es to [sic] exist, but whether it possible [sic] to identify such prices. More 
specifically, is it possible to analyze whether market-based price [sic] 
                                                                                                                            
load/nme-moe/comments-20071210/cccla-nme-moe-cmt-20071210.pdf [hereinafter 
CCCIEM December 10 Comment]. 
 185. China Chamber of Commerce of Metals, Minerals, Chemical Importers & Expor-
ters, Response to Antidumping Methodologies in Proceedings Involving Certain Non- 
Market Economies: Market-Oriented Enterprise; Request for Comment, at 3 (December 
10, 2007), http://ia.ita.doc.gov/download/nme-moe/comments-20071210/cccmc-nme-
moe-cmt-20071210.pdf [hereinafter CCCMMC December 10 Comment]. 
 186. China Chamber of Commerce for Import & Export of Textiles, Response to Anti-
dumping Methodologies in Proceedings Involving Certain Non-Market Economies: Mar-
ket-Oriented Enterprise; Request for Comment, at 2 (December 10, 2007), 
http://ia.ita.doc.gov/download/nme-moe/comments-20071210/ccct-nme-moe-cmt-
20071210.pdf [hereinafter CCCIET December 10 Comment]. 
 187. U.S. Steel June 25 Comment, supra note 166, at 8. 
 188. See David A. Hartquist, Comment on Behalf of Committee to Support U.S. Trade 
Laws, Response to Antidumping Methodologies in Proceedings Involving Certain Non- 
Market Economies: Market-Oriented Enterprise; Request for Comment, at 7 (December 
10, 2007), http://ia.ita.doc.gov/download/nme-moe/comments-20071210/csustl-nme-
moe-cmt-20071210.pdf [hereinafter Committee December 10 Comment]. 
 189. Id. at 8. 
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exist from the books and records of individual enterprises in the mar-
ket?”190 
The issue of whether the petitioner or respondent should bear the bur-
den of proof was particularly contentious, with several Responses in Fa-
vor arguing for a presumption of MOE status unless the petitioner can 
show evidence to the contrary.191 On the other hand, Reponses Against 
argued that if MOE status were presumed, the burden and expense of 
disproving MOE status would be excessive both to petitioners and also 
Commerce.192 
c. Administering MOE Valuation 
Assuming than an MOE test is legal and that individual MOEs can be 
identified, the more difficult question then becomes how to calculate 
normal value for the newly-dubbed MOE’s exports. The strongest pro-
posals put forward by the Responses in Favor advocated for a hybrid ap-
proach that combined aspects of NME methodology, and ME, as well as 
several innovative concepts not currently in use. 
For example, the Cheng Meng June 25 Comment advocated using ME 
valuation methods in situations involving foreign investment enterprises 
(“FIE”) and private Chinese companies, but using surrogate prices when 
the input in question is subject to price controls, guidance prices, etc.193 
Such a method would use home-market sales when possible, but likely 
disallow sales made to State Owned Enterprises (“SOE”), which them-
                                                                                                                            
 190. Id. 
 191. See, e.g., Bureau of Fair Trade for Imports and Exports of the Ministry of Com-
merce of the People’s Republic of China, Response to Antidumping Methodologies in 
Proceedings Involving Certain Non-Market Economies: Market-Oriented Enterprise; 
Request for Comment, at 7 (June 15, 2007), http://ia.ita.doc.gov/download/nme-
moe/boft-nme-moe-cmt-20070625.pdf [hereinafter BOFTA June 15 Comment] (arguing 
for a presumption of MOE status for Chinese enterprises, and urging that the burden of 
proving otherwise be put on the petitioner); Ou Meng, Comment on Behalf of China 
Chamber of Commerce of Import and Export of Foodstuffs Native Produce & Animal 
By-Products, Response to Antidumping Methodologies in Proceedings Involving Certain 
Non-Market Economies: Market-Oriented Enterprise; Request for Comment, at 2 (June 
21, 2007), http://ia.ita.doc.gov/download/nme-moe/cfna-nme-moe-cmt-20070625.pdf 
[hereinafter CCCIEF June 25 Comment] (urging Commerce to apply MOE treatment to 
all Chinese respondents). 
 192. See Committee December 10 Comment, supra note 188, at 6–7 (arguing that the 
multi-layered analysis necessary to disprove a respondent’s assertion of NME status 
would be “well-nigh impossible”). 
 193. Cheng Meng June 25 Comment, supra note 181, at 12 (recommending a surrogate 
valuation method or “de minimis” rule when an input is subject to Chinese government 
interference). 
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selves would be prima facie barred from MOE status.194 Although the 
Responses in Favor generally preferred a home-market method (unsur-
prisingly), if the constructed value method were used, they preferred that 
the test dictate the use of actual price paid for imported inputs195 and also 
allow use of the actual price paid if the input was purchased from an FIE 
or privately owned company.196 
The strongest argument seemed to be for an MOE method modeled af-
ter the ME Constructed Value methodology. This is in large part due to 
the fact that some inputs, such as those purchased from SOEs, would 
have to be valued separately, and the Constructed Value method is best 
suited to take multiple inputs into account. An approach modeled on the 
Constructed Value method would also address one of the primary con-
cerns of MOE valuation: that of a home-market method that would use 
the price of the product sold in the PRC as the normal value bench-
mark.197 
This concern is predicated on the possibility that government distor-
tions in the home market could distort demand, with the result that the 
home-market test would generate a deceptively low normal value.198 The 
implication for purposes of administrability was that in order to account 
for these potential distortions, Commerce would be forced to undertake 
the exhaustive task of examining the upstream and downstream markets 
for subject merchandise, rather than limiting its analysis to the individual 
seller.199 However, an MOE test employing constructed value analyses 
                                                                                                                            
 194. Id. at 9 n.12. 
 195. This would be consistent with Commerce’s current practice of using price paid 
for ME inputs. See, 19 C.F.R. § 351.408(c)(1) (2005). 
 196. See Cheng Meng June 25 Comment, supra note 181, at 11 (hypothesizing that a 
potential MOE test would use the actual price paid for inputs purchased from foreign-
investment enterprises). 
 197. See James R. Cannon, Jr., Comment on Behalf of ICL Performance Products, LP 
and Innophos, Response to Antidumping Methodologies in Proceedings Involving Cer-
tain Non-Market Economies: Market-Oriented Enterprise; Request for Comment, at 3–4 
(December 10, 2007), http://ia.ita.doc.gov/download/nme-moe/comments-20071210/icl-
innophos-nme-moe-cmt-20071210.pdf [hereinafter ICL December 10 Comment] (ad-
dressing the possibility of home-market price manipulation by stating “the questionnaire 
would have to be expanded to address whether home market prices are set in a free mar-
ket for the subject merchandise”). 
 198. Id. 
 199. See J. Christopher Wood, Comment on Behalf of Occidental Chemical Corp., 
Response to Antidumping Methodologies in Proceedings Involving Certain Non-Market 
Economies: Market-Oriented Enterprise; Request for Comment, at 6–7 (November 26, 
2007), http://ia.ita.doc.gov/download/nme-moe/comments-20071210/oxychem-clearon-
nme-moe-cmt-20071210.pdf [hereinafter OxyChem November 26 Comment] (“[T]he 
Department would be required to expand the scope of its analysis to determine whether 
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would be not only more feasible from a legal and administrative perspec-
tive, but could also help to alleviate these concerns.200 
The Responses in Favor were mixed on the important issue of how to 
address individual inputs that were clearly not market-oriented. Some 
responses, such as the Baosteel June 25 Comment, were apparently so 
confident that the majority of (its own) inputs would be market oriented, 
that they suggested, “if any price is found not to be market-driven, the 
department may rely on the surrogate methodology.”201 On the other 
hand, some responses rejected any use of surrogate-country methodolo-
gy, instead urging that Commerce only apply ME methodology to poten-
tial MOEs.202 
The Chutex December 10 Comment cautioned against simply reverting 
to traditional NME anti-dumping methods for MOE inputs that were de-
termined to be non-market-driven. It stated, “in the . . . case where it may 
be appropriate to limit an MOE finding, the Department has the tools to 
make such limitation feasible by not accepting a particular input cost as 
market-based.”203 
One of these suggested tools was an “inflator” for costs that could not 
be divorced from government control, such as labor, land and capital 
costs identified by the Georgetown Steel Memo.204 The “inflator” would 
increase these distorted costs by an ad valorem percentage equal to the 
distortion effect.205 According to the Chutex December 10 Comment, this 
                                                                                                                            
suppliers of inputs to the producer were similarly market-oriented and whether purchas-
ers in the non-market economy of the producer’s output operated according to market 
principles”). 
 200. While Responses Against argued that government intervention could affect the 
prices of inputs, necessitating a more complex analysis even for an MOE methodology 
more akin to constructed value, id. at 6, generally the arguments focused on likelihood of 
intervention in home-market demand. See U.S. Steel June 25 Comment, supra note 166, 
at 6–7 (questioning whether it is possible that all of a Chinese firm’s customers would be 
operating under market conditions). Whether or not the firm’s home-market customers 
were market oriented would only necessarily be factored in under a home-market ap-
proach, see Lindsey & Ikenson, supra note 38, at 6–8 (discussing the factors that are 
considered under the home-market approach). 
 201. Baosteel June 25 Comment, supra note 178, at 7. 
 202. See CCCMMC June 25 Comment, supra note 118, at 22 (arguing that, “in such a 
case [that inputs were purchased from a SOE] the Department would resort to a third-
country market (if such a market were viable) or constructed value, as opposed to using 
the NME methodology”). It is unclear where this approach expects Commerce to find 
values for those inputs purchased from an SOE under a constructed value analysis. 
 203. Chutex December 10 Comment, supra note 157, at 12. 
 204. Id. at 13. 
 205. Id. (stating that this “inflator” approach would be similar to adjustments proposed 
with respect to energy costs for companies from the Russian Federation in 2005). 
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approach would “lend[] stability and predictability to the Department’s 
calculations” and also be easier to administer than a mix-and-match sur-
rogate value approach.206 
This inflator approach would make sense, especially considering the 
understandable concerns that “a Market-Oriented Enterprise Test would 
require consideration of direct and indirect state influence in the competi-
tive environment in which an individual firm operates.”207 Echoing the 
Georgetown Steel Memorandum, the OxyChem November 26 Comment 
cited land, labor, and in particular, capital allocation, as the three most 
problematic areas in this regard.208 The inflator approach discussed above 
would be an elegant and equitable solution to these pervasively distorted 
factors. 
One proffered guideline for utilizing individual inputs was the oft-
repeated prohibition against allowing inputs paid to SOEs into the pro-
verbial cauldron.209 The OxyChem November 26 Comment argued, “any 
assessment of market-oriented enterprises should exclude state-owned 
enterprises in a non-market economy.”210 The underlying resistance to 
SOEs stems from the perception that “when [SOEs] receive economics 
benefits from the government, their price and output decisions are influ-
enced by those benefits and are thereby distorted. These distortions 
create false price signals that impact the competitive decisions of all 
firms within the industry.”211 
Merely excluding inputs purchased from SOEs while allowing ME 
valuation methods for the rest of the inputs would be unsatisfactory to 
the many Responses Against that point to the difficulty of uncoupling 
inputs that are operating under market principals from inputs that are af-
fected by the greater NME economy. Indeed, the primary factor identi-
fied by the Responses Against as an impediment to an administratively 
                                                                                                                            
 206. Id. 
 207. OxyChem November 26 Comment, supra note 199, at 5. 
 208. Id. at 4–6; see also ICL December 10 Comment, supra note 197, at 9 (arguing 
that “the banking system does not operate in a genuinely open market,” and that “the 
government continues to preserve its ability to direct the economy”). 
 209. See generally Cheng Meng June 25 Comment, supra note 181, at 11 (arguing for 
the exclusion of inputs subject to government price controls). This principal as applied 
would most likely exclude many SOEs, in particular those “pillar” SOEs discussed in 
Section III.C.2, infra. 
 210. Oxychem November 26 Comment, supra note 199, at 7. 
 211. Terence P. Stewart & Gert De Prest, Comment on Behalf of Stewart and Stewart, 
Response to Antidumping Methodologies in Proceedings Involving Certain Non-Market 
Economies: Market-Oriented Enterprise; Request for Comment, at 21 (Dec. 10, 2007), 
http://ia.ita.doc.gov/download/nme-moe/comments-20071210/stewart-stewart-nme-moe-
cmt-20071210.pdf [hereinafter Stewart December 10 Response]. 
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feasible MOE test was the difficulty of determining whether a given 
Chinese price was market-based or not.212 U.S. Steel June 25 Comment 
pointed out that, “even if a Chinese producer were to try to operate its 
own business on market principles, it is extremely unlikely that all of its 
myriad suppliers and customers would also be doing so.”213 The Ameri-
can Furniture June 25 Comment made a similar point: “[I]n order for an 
entity to operate as a market-oriented enterprise within an industry 
marked by non-market conditions, it would have to source its inputs . . . 
outside of the industry’s supply chain.”214   
Responding to the idea that Commerce could impose a system that 
would use actual Chinese costs for certain inputs, but use surrogate val-
ues for the three problematic inputs identified above, ICL December 10 
Comment stated that this would create a “hodge-podge of unrelated fac-
tor values.”215 Elaborating on this argument, the ICL December 10 
Comment asserted that all of the actual Chinese costs would inevitably 
be affected by the allocation of land, labor, and capital.216 Furthermore, it 
stated, “the surrogate overhead rate is divorced from its context in a par-
ticular market,” creating an “arbitrary[,] not accurate” result.217 
III. AN EQUITABLE APPROACH: LOGISTICS AND LEGALITY OF A 
WORKABLE MARKET-ORIENTED ENTERPRISE TEST 
In this final section I first argue that the current NME anti-dumping 
approach for the PRC is inadequate for its purpose, of dubious legality, 
and therefore needs to be supplemented by an MOE test that would ad-
dress these deficiencies. I follow up this assertion by laying out the 
framework for a workable MOE test conceptually grounded in a previous 
test called the “Bubbles of Capitalism,” while employing several distinct 
features. Next, I answer the question posed by Commerce regarding le-
gality, arguing that an MOE test is not only legal, but also required if 
                                                                                                                            
 212. See ICL December 10 Comment, supra note 197, at 5 (highlighting the scope of 
the analysis necessary to determine whether a given price was distorted). 
 213. U.S. Steel June 25 Comment, supra note 166, at 6. 
 214. American Furniture June 25 Comment, supra note 164, at 4. Although certainly 
valid, following this line of argument ultimately leads to the current MOI test, which has 
proven impossible to pass up to this point. From a policy perspective it is unfortunate that 
domestic producers and others who weighed in against the administrability of MOE valu-
ation were so united in their opposition to constructive feedback. 
 215. ICL December 10 Comment, supra note 197, at 9. 
 216. See id. at 9–10. For example, when a Chinese manufacturer purchases a raw ma-
terial from another Chinese manufacturer, the cost of that raw material would be affected 
by the same problematic distortions (e.g. capital, land, and labor) as the final product, and 
so on down the line, creating a cycle of distortion. 
 217. Id. at 10. 
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Commerce continues to apply CVD law to Chinese companies. Finally, I 
address the remaining issues of identification and administrability, in the 
context of the proposed test. 
A. A Market Oriented Enterprise Test Should be Adopted 
1. The Failure of the Status Quo 
While the current antiquated NME valuation method is itself probably 
inappropriate for use against the majority of Chinese respondents, the 
more fundamental problem with the current approach is the double impo-
sition of both CVD and anti-dumping remedies. To rectify this problem, 
an MOE test would provide an equitable opportunity not afforded by the 
MOI test for certain Chinese respondents in anti-dumping investigations 
to have the normal value of their products calculated fairly and consis-
tently without the problem of double remedies. 
It is significant that less than two months after Commerce changed its 
policy of not applying CVD law to NME countries, the agency published 
its first request for comment on a possible MOE approach.218 In the May 
25 Request, Commerce stated that it was considering an MOE approach 
in light of its determination that CVD laws were applicable to Chinese 
imports.219 The timing of the request, along with the references to mea-
surable state subsidies (required for a CVD investigation),220 argues that 
the impetus for an MOE test was directly related to the decision to im-
pose CVD laws to imports from the PRC. 
Commerce has long recognized that double remedies are generally not 
permitted by its regulations and has thus attempted to avoid imposing 
                                                                                                                            
 218. The preliminary decision to apply CVD law to imports from the PRC was an-
nounced on March 30, 2007, see Commerce Press Release, supra note 109. The first 
request for comment was published in the federal registrar on May 25, 2007, see May 25 
Request, 72 Fed. Reg. 29, 302. 
 219. See May 25 Request, 72 Fed. Reg. 29, 302 at 29, 302 (stating that it was request-
ing comment on the conditions for an MOE test “given the Department’s analysis in the 
March 29, 2007 Georgetown Steel Memorandum,” which served as a basis for its deci-
sion to apply CVD law). 
 220. Id. (“[I]t is possible to determine whether the state has bestowed a benefit upon a 
Chinese producer (i.e., a subsidy can be identified and measured)”) (emphasis added). It 
is important to note that this is a reference to the CVD analysis, rather than an admission 
that state subsidizations can be measured in the context of an MOE test, which is a com-
parison some Responses in Favor have drawn, see Huanzhong December 10 Comment, 
supra note 171, at 5 (“[I]f the subsidy can be ‘identified’ and ‘measured’ for the purpose 
of applying the anti-subsidy duty, the subsidy can also be identified and measured to 
make adjustments to the normal value in the anti-dumping proceeding.”). 
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them.221 In Certain Cut-To-Length Carbon Steel Plate From Germany: 
Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, Commerce 
refused to allow CVD to affect its calculation of normal value in an anti-
dumping case in order to avoid counting the same benefit twice.222 Simi-
larly, in Wheatland Tube Co. v. United States, the Court held that Com-
merce’s decision to deviate from its usual practices in order to avoid im-
posing a “double remedy” in a 201 Investigation was reasonable.223 Sig-
nificantly, GATT Article VI(5) also states, “No product of the territory 
of any Member imported into the territory of any other Member shall be 
subject to both anti-dumping and countervailing duties to compensate for 
the same situation of dumping or export subsidization.”224 
The AAFA addressed this situation of double remedies in its December 
10 Comment. It stated: 
[I]f a countervailing duty is applied to offset an upstream subsidy on a 
particular input in a countervailing duty proceeding involving the same 
product from [the PRC], an anti-dumping calculation based on anything 
higher than the respondent’s actual costs for that input would inevitably 
result in [double] remedies that are disproportionate with the subsidies 
granted.225 
This argument makes sense: if a surrogate value approach results in a 
factor of production that is higher than a producer’s cost, the difference 
represents a benefit to the company. 
The surrogate-country valuation method produces higher dumping 
margins than the home market or constructed value methods, effectively 
acting as a penalty for enjoying the benefits of a quasi-state controlled 
economy like the PRC’s. These benefits, while certainly worthy of a pe-
nalty to offset the inequitable advantage over competing American com-
panies, are best addressed by CVD law. 
                                                                                                                            
 221. See Certain Cut-To-Length Carbon Steel Plate From Germany: Final Results of 
Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 62 Fed. Reg. 18390, 18, 395 (Dep’t of Com-
merce, April 15, 1997) (stating that double counting was “unjustifiable”). 
 222. Id. 
 223. Wheatland Tube Co. v. United States, 495 F.3d 1355, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2007). A 
201 Investigation is an unfair trade action similar in effect to an anti-dumping investiga-
tion, see id. 
 224. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Article VI: Anti-dumping and Counter-
vailing Duties, ¶ 5, 1947, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_01_e.htm#articleVI. 
 225. Letter from Kevin M. Burke, Chief Executive Officer and President. American 
Apparel and Footwear Association, to David M. Spooner, Assistant Secretary for Import 
Administration of U.S. Dept of Commerce, at 3 (December 10, 2007), available at 
http://ia.ita.doc.gov/download/nme-moe/comments-20071210/aafa-nme-moe-cmt-
20071210.pdf [hereinafter AAFA December 10 Comment]. 
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It is the position of this Note that applying both CVD law and NME 
anti-dumping law to Chinese imports is essentially granting double-
remedies, and Commerce is acting consistently with its past approach of 
avoiding this situation by attempting to formulate an MOE test. Com-
merce has made it clear that this is against its policy, and as the case be-
low explains, the courts have held that Commerce must modify its ap-
proach in the future to avoid the double remedy phenomenon. 
2. The GPX Int’l Tire Corp. Mandate 
On September 18 the Court of International Trade addressed the prob-
lem of double remedies in its GPX Int’l Tire Corp. decision.226 This case 
arose from a challenge to Commerce’s decision to apply both CVD law 
and NME anti-dumping methodology to imports of pneumatic off-road 
tires from the PRC. Agreeing with the respondent that “the application of 
both the CVD and anti-dumping law using the NME methodology results 
in a double counting of duties,”227 the court ordered Commerce to decide 
between foregoing the imposition of CVDs on Chinese imports and 
adapting its NME methodology, presumably by creating a workable 
MOE test.228 
The Court’s rational for requiring Commerce to choose between CVD 
and a new NME anti-dumping method was similar to the reasoning 
above. The Court agreed that CVD law and NME valuation in anti-
dumping cases addressed many of the same practices. Specifically, it 
stated that, “the NME anti-dumping statute was designed to account for 
government intervention in an NME country’s economy, including re-
sulting price distortion.”229 Referring to the similarity between the former 
statute and the CVD statute, the Court stated, “the anti-dumping and 
CVD law when applied to NME countries both work to correct govern-
ment distortion of market prices.”230 
Significantly, the Court seized upon Commerce’s failure to implement 
a workable test for MOE treatment, finding the decision to address the 
plaintiff’s request for MOE status to be “arbitrary and capricious.”231 
Even more significantly (especially for the purposes of this Note), the 
Court essentially mandated that Commerce consider a Chinese respon-
                                                                                                                            
 226. See 645 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1241 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2009) (holding that the current 
NME anti-dumping framework combined with the application of CVDs constituted a 
double remedy). 
 227. Id. at 20. 
 228. Id. at 28–29. 
 229. Id. at 17–18. 
 230. Id. at 19. 
 231. Id. at 30. 
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dent’s request for MOE status in order to comply with the statutory re-
quirement to “establish[] antidumping margins as accurately as possi-
ble.”232 Because this part of the decision was contextually separated from 
discussion of the CVD investigation, it leaves open the possibility that 
Commerce must at least consider granting MOE status to Chinese res-
pondents even in situations where CVD law was not being applied.233 
The GPX court concluded that Commerce would have to choose be-
tween not applying CVDs to NMEs and constructing a new NME anti-
dumping methodology.234 Leaving the choice in the agency’s hands, the 
court stated, “Commerce must determine how best to harmonize these 
two statutes and account for the fact that the statute provides no direction 
as to how to calculate both NME ADs and CVDs at the same time.”235 At 
the least, the decision was an endorsement of the MOE test. Moreover, 
assuming that Commerce decides not to rescind application of CVD law 
to the PRC, the decision is clearly a mandate to implement an MOE or 
similar test. 
On April 26, 2010, Commerce released a redetermination in response 
to a remand order issued by the GPX court (“Redetermination”).236 In the 
Redetermination, Commerce defended its decision to apply CVD law to 
the PRC.237 It also stated that it has “no procedure or policy governing 
any category of NME companies as MOEs, [nor] criteria that could be 
used to qualify any respondent company as an MOE.”238 
The lack of framework notwithstanding, Commerce did agree to con-
sider the request for MOE status from Starbright, one of the tire-importer 
respondents. Without “official” factors to work from, Commerce ana-
lyzed the three factors identified as indicatory of MOE status by Star-
                                                                                                                            
 232. Id. at 32–33 (citing Shakeproof Assembly Components v. United States, 268 F.3d 
1376, 1382). 
 233. Id. at 35 (“It is impossible to tell if Commerce was not required to apply MOE 
status to [respondent] because Commerce simply refused to address the issue. As stated 
previously, however, if the CVD statute is being imposed in an NME country situation, 
Commerce must modify its application of the NME anti-dumping statute, which it did not 
do”) (emphasis added). 
 234. Id. at 35–36. 
 235. Id. at 35. 
 236. Results of Redetermination Pursuant to Remand, GPX Int’l Tire Corp. v. United 
States, Consol. Court No. 08-00285 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2009) (stating that Commerce does 
not have any MOE procedures in place to address the problem of double counting, and 
stating Commerce’s intent to address this issue temporarily by offsetting the CVD penal-
ties against the anti-dumping penalties). 
 237. Id. at 7–8. Based on the GPX holding, discussed supra p. 48–49, a decision to 
continue to apply CVD law to the PRC would require Commerce to address the problem 
of double-counting, most likely via an MOE test. 
 238. Id. at 12. 
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bright itself: its complete ownership by a U.S. company; its focus upon 
external markets; and its belief that any distortions to manufacturing 
costs would be addressed by CVD law.239 
Regarding the “foreign ownership” argument, Commerce stated that 
while foreign ownership can be relevant to the separate rate analysis,240 it 
wanted Starbright to explain how American-style “market principles and 
managerial systems” affected production costs, which Commerce argued 
was relevant to an analysis of whether “available information permits the 
calculation of normal value.”241 This implicit reference to the second re-
quirement laid out in 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(1) marks an acknowledgment 
by Commerce that it is considering an MOE test justified, at least in part, 
on that section of the Tariff Act.242 
In responding to Starbright’s “external market focus” requirement, 
Commerce again referenced the “available information” section of the 
Tariff Act.243 It argued that an emphasis on sales to external market 
“does not speak to domestic production” and does not defeat the conclu-
sion that government distortions “render[] price comparisons and the cal-
culation of production costs invalid under [ME] methodologies.”244 Fi-
nally, Commerce dismissed the argument that the presence of a “compa-
nion CVD case” should serve as grounds to grant MOE status as “unsup-
ported by record evidence.”245 
Although the arguments advanced by Strarbright were perhaps lacking 
the persuasive power of several of the more well-considered Arguments 
in Favor [of an MOE test], Commerce rejected any real analysis of 
whether Starbright could be considered to operate under market-oriented 
conditions, and instead opted for a less thoughtful approach.246 To ad-
dress the problem of double remedies, Commerce decided to offset the 
GPX respondents’ CVD duty against their calculated dumping margin.247 
This exceptionally straightforward methodology is neither accurate nor 
satisfactory, nor is it logical. It is not accurate because it does not distin-
                                                                                                                            
 239. Id. at 15. 
 240. For a discussion of the separate rate analysis, see supra Section 1.C.4. 
 241. Id. at 16. 
 242. For a discussion of the two prong test laid out in 18 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(1), see 
supra note 66. 
 243. Results, supra note 236, at 17. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. 
 246. While Commerce’s rather dismissive analysis of Starbright’s MOE status certain-
ly was consistent with Commerce’s admitted failure to generate any of its own MOE 
criteria, at least Starbright gets points for trying. Commerce’s response was a template, so 
to speak, for paying mere lip-service to a court’s mandate. 
 247. Results, supra note 236, at 3. 
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guish between duty attributable to government subsidies and duty attri-
butable to under-priced goods. It is surely unsatisfactory to the domestic 
industry because it neuters CVD law to the point where the only case 
where it is beneficial to bring a CVD case against a PRC respondent 
would be when the CVD actually exceeds the dumping margin, drastical-
ly disincentivizing the domestic industry from bringing CVD investiga-
tions. Finally, per Commerce’s own admission, it is not logical that anti-
dumping law and CVD law were not meant to be mutually exclusive.248 
Ultimately, the Redetermination is illustrative of the fact that Com-
merce has yet to develop a clear MOE policy. Furthermore, the inade-
quacy of the offsetting solution suggests that Commerce will continue to 
resist setting out a framework until it has exhausted its judicial remedies 
in regards to the GPX decision.249 
3. A Market Oriented Enterprise Test is Good Foreign Policy 
I argue that creating a reliable, efficient, and predictable MOE test 
would be beneficial even if avoiding double counting and the GPX deci-
sion are not yet driving Commerce’s policy. First, a test that is reliable 
and predictable would undercut many of the problems with the current 
surrogate-value approach. Second, it would help modernize our trade 
laws to reflect the economic realities of the Chinese economy. Finally, it 
would create an effective policy lever with which to engage the PRC and 
encourage the development of independent institutions in that country. 
As discussed above in Section I, the current surrogate country method 
lacks the predictability and consistency of the ME valuation methods.250 
The main reason the method is so unpredictable is the wide range of ac-
ceptable surrogate-country data sets, combined with the fact that the data 
set so employed may be changed from year to year. Eliminating reliance 
on surrogate-country data for most inputs and employing a simple and 
consistent inflator for those inputs that are subject to unspecific distor-
tions not addressed by CVD law would increase overall efficiency by 
decreasing burdensome and unpredictable litigation for both Chinese 
respondents as well as the domestic industry. 
Additionally, the current policy of applying NME valuation across-the-
board in anti-dumping cases means that imports from a U.S.-owned and 
                                                                                                                            
 248. See id. at 7–8 (noting that it “does not agree that the [Tariff Act] necessitates the 
‘coordination’ of concurrent [ anti-dumping] and [CVDs]”). 
 249. See Order, GPX Int’l Tire Corp. v. United States, Consol. Court No. 08-00285 
(Ct. Int’l Trade 2009) (on file with author) (stating that “it is important to get this case in 
a position for appeal” and also questioning whether Commerce’s redetermination has 
adequately complied with the remand order). 
 250. Laroski, supra note 49, at 395. 
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managed company operating in the PRC faces the same constraints as 
products created by a Chinese SOE. NME valuation methods were first 
propagated against Soviet command-style economies that did not allow 
or severely restricted foreign capital investment and ownership.251 In 
contrast, today the PRC ranks among the top destinations for foreign di-
rect investment in the world.252 Although the Chinese government con-
tinues to exert significant control over SOEs,253 private enterprises in the 
PRC have “significant discretion” over major business decisions, accord-
ing to Commerce.254 Consequently, it does not make sense to subject for-
eign-owned enterprises to the same valuation methods as SOEs, especial-
ly considering the context in which such methods were created. 
Finally, implementing an MOE test would create particularized incen-
tives for market-based reform in the Chinese economy. In compliance 
with its WTO Accession requirements, the PRC has begun to privatize 
some of its SOEs, largely through the securities markets.255 An MOE test 
that penalized firms for purchasing too many inputs from SOEs would 
further incentivize the privatization of these enterprises, as well as dis-
courage the banking practices that artificially help to stabilize them.256 
B. Logistics of a Proposed MOE Test 
1. An Old Approach New Again: “Bubbles of Capitalism” 
Before Commerce formulated the current MOI test, it briefly employed 
an unusually named “Bubbles of Capitalism” (“Bubbles”) test that calcu-
lated normal value for an individual respondent by using actual input 
price for inputs that were determined to be market driven, while using 
                                                                                                                            
 251. See generally W. Gary Vause, Perestroika and Market Socialism: The Effects of 
Communism’s Slow Thaw on East-West Economic Relations, 9 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 
213 (1988). 
 252. See Stock of Direct Foreign Investment – At Home, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 
AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/rankorder/2198rank.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2009) (showing the PRC ranked 
among the top ten countries receiving direct foreign investment). 
 253. See Georgetown Steel Memorandum, supra note 4, at 8 (describing various con-
trol levers at the disposal of the Chinese government over SOEs). 
 254. Id. at 7. 
 255. Jiangyu Wang, Dancing with Wolves: Regulation and Deregulation of Foreign 
Investment in China’s Stock Market, 5 ASIAN-PACIFIC L. & POL’Y J. 1, 47–48 (2004) 
(discussing the role of securities markets in advancing economic reform in the PRC). 
 256. Georgetown Steel Memorandum, supra note 4, at 9 (discussing how the PRC’s 
misuse of its banking sector control has perpetuated unsustainable corporate practices 
among certain SOEs and irresponsible lending within the banking sector). 
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surrogate figures for those that were not.257 This input-by-input approach, 
along with several modifications discussed in the next section, would 
serve as a solid foundation for a workable MOE test. 
When it implemented the Bubbles approach, Commerce stated, “there 
is nothing to be gained in terms of accuracy, fairness, or predictability in 
using surrogate values when market-determined values exists in the 
NME country.”258 Commerce applied the Bubbles test by analyzing the 
extent to which each input was controlled by the state.259 Even though 
Commerce would only grant complete ME valuation if every input was 
market-based, it decided that the anti-dumping statute directed it to use 
actual price for each individual input that passed the test.260 
While rather unfortunately named, the Bubbles test produced more 
positive findings of market orientation in its two applications than the 
MOI test has in fifteen years.261 When Commerce applied this test to its 
initial anti-dumping action against Chrome-plated Lug Nuts from the 
PRC, it found that two of the major inputs purchased domestically over-
came the presumption of state control, and thus, those prices could be 
used in the factor of production formula instead of a surrogate-country 
value.262 In support of its new approach, Commerce went so far as to 
state in Oscillating Fans that, “[re]quiring the use of surrogate values in 
a situation where actual market-based prices incurred by a particular firm 
are available would be contrary to the statutory purpose.”263 
Commentators remarked that this Bubbles approach (sometimes more 
benignly referred to as “mix and match”) “mitigated the worst faults of 
                                                                                                                            
 257. Luke P. Bellocchi, The Effects of and Trends In Executive Policy and Court Of 
International Trade (CIT) Decisions Concerning Antidumping and the Non-Market 
Economy (NME) of the People’s Republic of China, 10 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 177, 208 
(Winter, 1997) (“[Commerce] would use those inputs from the home country that were 
determined to be market driven, while using surrogate figures for the rest”). 
 258. Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Chrome-Plated Lug Nuts 
From the People’s Republic of China, 56 Fed. Reg. 46, 153, 46, 154 (Dep’t of Commerce 
1991) [hereinafter Lug Nuts]. 
 259. See id. at 46, 155 (“We have determined whether particular inputs are market-
driven by analyzing the extent to which each factor input is state-controlled”). 
 260. See id. (stating that the price for certain inputs may be appropriate when “market 
forces” are at work). 
 261. This, of course, is due to the fact that while the Bubbles approach identified mar-
ket-oriented inputs, see id. at 46, 155, the MOI test has yet to identify a single market-
oriented industry, see May 25 Request, 72 Fed. Reg. 29, 302 at 29, 303. 
 262. See Lug Nuts, 56 Fed. Reg. 46, 153, at 46, 155 (finding that “the presumption of 
state control” had been “overcome” for the inputs of steel and chemicals”). 
 263. Final Determinations of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Oscillating Fans and Ceil-
ing Fans From the People’s Republic of China, 56 Fed. Reg. 55, 271, 55, 275 (Dep’t 
Comm.1991). 
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the factors-of-production methodology” and “enhanced the accuracy, 
fairness, and predictability of the dumping determination.”264 In retros-
pect, the major criticism of this approach was that it potentially exposed 
market-oriented sectors of an NME country to CVD actions while leav-
ing the non-market driven sectors insulated.265 Significantly, under 
Commerce’s current approach of applying CVDs to the PRC this would 
no longer be a concern. 
Unfortunately, Commerce’s enthusiasm for bubbles popped rather un-
expectedly when it decided to end the test less than six months after a 
CVD case was initiated against a Chinese respondent.266 In addition to 
the problem with the CVDs, Commerce also decided that the Bubbles of 
Capitalism approach failed to account for “indirect effects of nonmarket 
economy distortions”267 and that ultimately, “the scope of inquiry was 
too narrow.”268 I address the concerns of indirect distortions and scope in 
the following section. 
2. Modifications to the Bubbles Approach 
This Note proposes an MOE test that combines the Bubbles approach 
of an input-by-input analysis, with a basket system to address CVD over-
lap, while using the “inflator” approach posited in the December 10 Chu-
tex Response to address indirect NME distortions. This approach would 
best address the problems identified with the Bubbles test, while preserv-
ing a role for CVD law to function alongside a modified anti-dumping 
NME approach for the PRC.269 
                                                                                                                            
 264. Robert L. Harris, Note, Goin’ Down the Road Feeling Bad: U.S. Trade Laws’ 
Discriminatory Treatment of the East European Economies in Transition to Capitalism, 
31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 403, 429 (1993); see also Jeffrey P. Bialos et al., Trading 
with Central and Eastern Europe: The Application of the U.S. Unfair Trade Laws to 
Economies in Transition, 7 INT’L L. PRACTICUM 69, 73 (1994) (“By allowing the use of 
actual prices for particular market-driven inputs, Commerce was trying to improve the 
accuracy and fairness of the less-than-fair value calculation.”). 
 265. See Harris, supra note 264, at 435 (“[a] nation in transition from communism to 
capitalism [becomes] highly vulnerable to CVD liability.”). 
 266. See id. at 436. Harris, I must confess, was not responsible for the pun. 
 267. David W. Richardson & Robert E. Neilsen, Recent Development in the Treatment 
of Nonmarket Economies Under the anti-dumping/CVD Laws, 789 PLI/CORP 149, 159 
(Oct. 1–2, 1992). 
 268. Amendment to Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value and 
Amendment to Antidumping Duty Order: Chrome-Plated Lug Nuts From the People’s 
Republic of China, 57 Fed. Reg. 15, 052, 15, 053 (Dep’t of Commerce, 1992) [hereinaf-
ter Lug Nuts Amendment]. 
 269. While the Dec. 10 Chutex Response, supra note 157, did not discuss the inflator 
concept in great detail, it referred to Magnesium Metal from the Russian Federation: 
Notice of Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value, 70 Fed. Reg. 9041, 9043 
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My proposed MOE test would work by examining the component in-
puts of a given product and breaking them down into individual price 
tags, similar to the constructed value approach. For inputs that Com-
merce determined to be produced and exchanged under market condi-
tions, the respondent would be allowed to use the cost paid in the local 
currency, identical to the approach used by the Bubbles test. 
To address the problem of double remedies and NME distortion, non 
market-based inputs (i.e. those affected by NME distortions) would be 
divided into two baskets. One basket would contain all distortions cur-
rently accounted for by CVD law. For example, because CVD duties ac-
count for direct government spending on energy subsidies, all energy 
inputs that were so subsidized would go into the CVD basket. In contrast 
to the Bubbles approach, respondents would be able to use their actual 
costs for the distorted inputs that land in the CVD basket, which would 
satisfy the need to avoid double-remedies.270 Because CVD duties were 
not applied to NME countries when the Bubbles approach was formu-
lated, this would be a needed modification of the original Bubbles 
framework. 
The inputs in the second basket, those that suffer from NME distor-
tions not addressed under CVD law, would be subject to the application 
of an inflator. This inflator would impose a tariff proportional to the av-
erage benefit conferred. For example, if the benefit from a particular dis-
torted input was not taken into account under CVD law, an inflator, or 
markup may be applied to the corresponding input.271 The basket ap-
proach is further discussed in the section on administrability below. 
Such a test would eliminate the administrative and legal burden, not to 
mention the uncertainty and inaccuracy, of surrogate values. It would 
also comply with the policy and GPX mandate to avoid double-counting 
CVD and anti-dumping duties. Finally, with the addition of certain re-
quirements discussed below, it would be more reflective of the modern 
state of the Chinese economy. 
                                                                                                                            
(Dep’t Commerce Feb. 24, 2005), in which Commerce responded to petitioners argument 
that an inflator should be applied to a Russian mining company’s energy costs to reflect 
non-market economy style distortions. In that case, Commerce abstained from applying 
an inflator, but it did reserve for itself the legal authority to do so, stating, “the Depart-
ment has the discretion to calculate the costs of production by some other reasonable 
means,” id. 
 270. The benefit received from the subsidy could be recovered under a parallel or sub-
sequent CVD investigation. 
 271. For example, if Commerce were to find that wages were artificially suppressed in 
the particular region of the PRC where a certain good was produced, it could apply an 
inflator to the labor input equal to the percent those wages were suppressed in compari-
son to unsuppressed Chinese wages. 
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C. Response to Commerce’s Request for Comment 
1. Legality 
When Commerce published its October 25 Request, there were two 
implicit threshold questions regarding the legality of an MOE test: first, 
whether Commerce has the power to calculate normal value using actual 
costs in an NME context, and second, whether it has the power to apply 
this analysis to individual firms.272 I argue that both of these questions 
should be answered in the affirmative. 
Commerce answered the first question in the affirmative itself when it 
published notice that it was rescinding its Bubbles test in favor of the 
MOI test. At that time it defended the legality of an input-based approach 
by stating, “section 773(c)(1)(B) allows the Department to calculate for-
eign market value using normal foreign market value methodologies de-
spite the fact that the economy of the subject country, on a macro basis, 
is nonmarket in nature.” 273 
In defending its decision under the Bubbles approach, Commerce 
noted it was not legally authorized to employ the factors of production 
methodology unless it found that the available information “did not per-
mit” it to determine normal value using ME country methodologies.274 
When Commerce refined its Bubbles test to evaluate each individual in-
put under the above analysis, it stated that such an approach was in line 
with Congressional intent by, “not using NME prices to determine FMV, 
while at the same time recognizing that an NME country that is under-
going a transition to a market-oriented economy may contain sectors 
within its overall economic structure where market forces have already 
come into play.”275 
The courts have generally deferred to Commerce’s interpretations of 
unfair trade law statutes.276 In Sigma Corp. v. United States, the court 
noted that Commerce has “broad authority to interpret the antidumping 
statute and devise procedures to carry out the statutory mandate.”277 In 
fact, Commerce has already exhibited this authority to interpret the anti-
dumping statute by formulating the MOI test. One can also interpret the 
                                                                                                                            
 272. See October 25 Request, 72 Fed. Reg. 60, 649 at 60, 650 (discussing the legal 
arguments regarding the MOE test). 
 273. See Lug Nuts Amendment, 57 Fed. Reg. 15, 052, at 15, 054-55. 
 274. Id. at 15, 054. This interpretation is consistent with the argument raised in the 
Chutex December 10 Comment, supra note 157, at 2. 
 275. Lug Nuts, 56 Fed. Reg. 46, 153, at 46, 155. 
 276. Although GPX, 645 F. Supp. 2d, is a rather notable exception, for the more com-
mon approbation see Sigma, infra note 277, at 1405. 
 277. Sigma Corp. v. United States, 117 F.3d 1401, 1405 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
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current exception that enables an NME enterprise to use actual costs for 
purchases from an ME country as another example of how Commerce 
has modified its valuation approach in the past without interference from 
the courts. 
In fact, the court tacitly affirmed the legality of using market prices for 
individual inputs in Consolidated Int’l Automotive v. United States.278 In 
that case, the Court of International Trade upheld Commerce’s authority 
to implement the Bubbles approach.279 Addressing Commerce’s decision 
to re-formulate its valuation approach for NME respondents, the court 
stated, “Commerce has presented an acceptable basis both in law and fact 
for its actions.”280 
To address the second question of whether it is legal for Commerce to 
single out individual respondents for special treatment, I would concur 
with the argument presented by the Textile Counsel December 10 Com-
ment, that other practices such as the ME currency exceptions (as well as 
the separate rates test) “reinforce the principle that the Department may 
deviate from its . . . NME methodology.”281 
The approach recommended by this Note does not expand Com-
merce’s authority to single out individual respondents beyond the liberal 
powers they currently posses. Also, because the approach borrows heavi-
ly from the Bubbles approach approved in Consolidated, while also res-
ponding to concerns about double remedies raised by the Court of Inter-
national Trade, the proposed approach satisfies the threshold questions of 
legality. Most importantly, this approach attempts to satisfy the require-
ment to calculate anti-dumping margins “as accurately as possible,” 
which is ultimately the goal of any valuation approach, and certainly the 
goal of calculating normal value.282 
2. Identifying MOEs 
As discussed above, many of the Responses Against argued that it 
would be impossible to identify an MOE due to the profusion of NME 
distortions throughout the PRC’s economy.283 The MOE approach rec-
ommended by this Note addresses this concern by adopting a presump-
                                                                                                                            
 278. Consolidated Int’l Automotive v. United States 16 C.I.T. 692, 696–97 (Ct. Int’l 
Trade 1992) (holding that Commerce’s Bubbles approach was not unjustified). 
 279. See id. at 696–97 (stating that a change of methodology “does not make Com-
merce’s original [Bubbles] approach unjustified”). 
 280. Id. at 696. 
 281. Textile Counsel December 10 Comment, supra note 163, at 3–4. 
 282. Allied Pac. Food, supra note 77, at 1342. 
 283. See U.S. Steel June 25 Comment, supra note 166, at 7 (arguing that the market 
distortions are of such severity that the existence of an MOE is inconceivable). 
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tion of MOE status for all non-SOEs. For SOEs that are partially priva-
tized and not operating in one of the “pillar” industries toward which the 
PRC is consolidating its state control, a test similar to the separate-rate 
test would be a fair way to identify the SOEs that are only nominally 
state owned, as opposed to the SOEs that are permeated by NME distor-
tions to the extent that MOE status would not apply, as discussed below. 
Using a separate-rate test analysis to identify SOEs that may be market 
oriented would facilitate MOE identification by employing a method that 
Commerce is familiar with and currently uses effectively.284 The identifi-
cation issue is further simplified by the assumption that all non-SOEs are 
market-oriented to the extent that their inputs are determined under mar-
ket conditions. Shifting the benefit of MOE status away from automatic 
market economy valuation and towards an input-by-input approach 
makes identification as an MOE less contentious. Rather, the emphasis 
shifts to the individual inputs employed by the MOE, making it more 
important for an enterprise to employ market-oriented inputs than to 
achieve nominal MOE status. 
3. Administering an MOE Test 
a. Application of the Test to State-Owned Enterprises 
While the Chinese government has been making efforts to implement 
market-style reforms to SOEs for years, SOEs are still largely directed by 
the hand of the state.285 As a result, the SOEs, especially the banks, con-
tinue to serve as significant barriers to comprehensive market reform.286 
Because of the pervasiveness of NME distortions regarding SOEs, the 
MOE test should contain a disqualification threshold for manufacturers 
that receive a threshold level of their inputs from SOEs. 
The government of the PRC began the process of de-centralizing its 
SOEs in 1978, one year before signing the historic Sino-U.S. Trade 
Agreement.287 Yuma Wei writes that in 1993, “the introduction of mod-
ern corporate governance mechanisms was emphasized, and trials of cor-
poratization and privatization were carried out in selected sectors and 
enterprises.”288 More recently, the PRC has focused on consolidating the 
                                                                                                                            
 284. See Separate Rates Policy Bulletin, supra note 84, at 1 (discussing the separate 
rates test). 
 285. See August 30 Memorandum, supra note 127, at 73 (discussing the role of the 
banks as regional barriers). 
 286. Id. 
 287. See Vause, supra note 251, at 223–24. 
 288. Yuwa Wei, An Overview of Corporate Governance In China, 30 Syracuse J. 
INT’L L. & COM. 23, 37 (2003). 
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largest SOEs that operate in “pillar industries,” while continuing to pri-
vatize SOEs operating in other areas of the economy.289 
Despite the fact that many SOEs now operate as quasi-private entities, 
those SOEs operating in the “pillar industries” remain “excessively bur-
dened by a range of social obligations,” which results in significant gov-
ernment intervention, especially in the banking sector.290 While identify-
ing SOEs is a straightforward task,291 it is more difficult to measure the 
extent of government interference.292 Commerce found that “the gov-
ernment no longer sustains such SOEs through the traditional means of 
direct resource allocations or the setting of prices (which are now largely 
freely set), but instead through a complex web of regulatory restrictions, 
control over the allocation of land-use rights, and the continued domin-
ance accorded to the state-owned banking sector.”293 
Whether or not subsidization of SOEs can be measured by CVD law is 
subject to a specificity requirement, yet in a 2008 determination, Com-
merce found certain subsidies to SOEs to be so measurable.294 Rather 
than apply a CVD-style specificity test to each situation where a Chinese 
respondent does business with a non-FIE SOE, creating an administrative 
workload that would be both duplicative and inefficient, it would be 
more efficient to disallow MOE status to respondents that purchase a 
significant amount of their inputs from SOEs. 
Commerce already employs “threshold” rules in several anti-dumping 
situations, such as representation requirements.295 Furthermore, “bright 
line” tests such as threshold requirements promote predictability, effi-
                                                                                                                            
 289. Id. at 38. Under this policy, SOEs remain dominant in certain high-tech sectors: 
non-renewable natural resource sectors; public utility and infrastructure sectors; and na-
tional security sectors. 
 290. Id. at 39–40 (arguing that the antiquated system in which SOEs played a quasi-
government role by providing a variety of social services now makes it difficult for many 
of these enterprises to fully privatize). 
 291. In fact, the Chinese government maintains a (somewhat outdated) list of Chinese 
SOEs online. See GOV.cn, A-Z Index of China’s State Enterprises, 
http://www.gov.cn/misc/2005-10/21/content_80894.htm (last visited Apr. 04, 2009). 
 292. Georgetown Memorandum, supra note 4, at 3 (discussing the “complex web” of 
regulatory restrictions, etc., that the government uses to manipulate the Chinese econo-
my). 
 293. Id. 
 294. Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires From the People’s Republic of China: 
Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination and Final Negative Determination 
of Critical Circumstances, 73 Fed. Reg. 40480, 40485 (Dep’t of Commerce, 2008) (de-
ciding that an income tax exemption to an SOE was countervailable). 
 295. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(c)(4)(A) (2006). 
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ciency, and uniformity.296 Finally, because the so-called “pillar indus-
tries” in the PRC often correspond to powerful U.S. industries most wary 
of an MOE test, the SOE threshold requirement would serve as an effec-
tive bar to MOE status for enterprises in these “pillar industries” that suf-
ficiently enjoy the benefits of operating in these industries, which could 
potentially lowering resistance to a new approach from domestic U.S. 
producers who operate in the same industries.297 
b. Administering the Test for Privately Held Companies 
A presumption of MOE status is simple to implement from an adminis-
trative perspective. After making the initial determination, Commerce 
would need to develop a method to identify individual inputs that are 
market oriented. While Commerce briefly employed an input-by-input 
test under its Bubbles approach, it cited the difficulty of identifying in-
puts that were free of NME distortions as one of the reasons for abandon-
ing the test.298 The approach recommended here addresses this adminis-
trative problem by only allowing a respondent to use actual price-paid 
under two circumstances: either the input is clearly market oriented, or 
the input is accounted for under CVD law. The upstream, non-explicit 
distortions referenced in the Lug Nuts Amendment,299 and also in the 
Georgetown Steel Memorandum,300 are addressed using the inflator. 
In the situations where it is extremely clear that the input is market 
oriented (e.g., a manufactured input purchased from a wholly-foreign 
owned enterprise operating outside of the SOE “pillars,” or an input pur-
chased from an ME supplier), the actual price paid would be utilized. In 
the case of inputs, such as labor, that are found to be distorted, applying a 
                                                                                                                            
 296. See Cassandra Jones Harvard, Goin’ Round in Circles . . . and Letting the Bad 
Loans Win: When Subprime Lending Fails Borrowers: The Need for Uniform Broker 
Regulation, 86 NEB. L. REV. 737, 792 (2008) (discussing the importance of predictability, 
efficiency and uniformity from a regulatory perspective). 
 297. At least six of the June 25 Responses Against were filed on behalf of the Steel 
Industry. In the PRC, the Steel industry is considered the archetypical SOE. See Import 
Administration, Antidumping Methodologies in Proceedings Involving Certain Non-
Market Economies Market-Oriented Enterprise, http://ia.ita.doc.gov/download/nme-
moe/nme-moe-cmt-20070625-index.html (last visited December 21, 2009); Thomas Bri-
zendine & Charles Oliver, China’s Steel Sector in Transition, THE CHINA BUS. REV. 
(Jan.–Feb. 2001), available at http://chinabusinessreview.net/public/0101/oliver.html. 
 298. See Lug Nuts Amendment, 57 Fed. Reg. 15, 052, at 15, 053 (discussing how the 
absence of “explicit government involvement” is not enough to warrant a finding of mar-
ket orientation) (emphasis added). 
 299. Id. 
 300. Georgetown Steel Memorandum, supra note 4, at 5 (discussing the “broader, 
distorted economic environment”). 
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pre-determined inflator (perhaps one that considered factors such as geo-
graphy, industry, etc.) would require some up-front determinations, but 
ultimately would also be a straightforward and predictable process. 
Finally, identifying inputs covered by CVD law in order to exempt 
those inputs from the inflator adjustment is administratively possible due 
to Commerce’s extensive experience determining what is and what is not 
measureable as a CVD, as well as its recent determination that subsidies 
in the PRC have become measurable in general.301 The fact that Com-
merce has decided to apply CVD law to respondents in the PRC is in 
itself evidence that identifying CVD benefits is administratively feasible, 
and therefore removing those inputs affected by such benefits should be 
feasible as well. 
D. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the proposed MOE approach would provides for pre-
dictable, consistent, and accurate valuation. Commerce has the authority 
to implement it based on court approval of the Bubbles approach as well 
as tacit approval for its separate rate-status test. An MOE test is not only 
legal, but also necessary to correct double remedy problems if Com-
merce continues to apply CVD law to Chinese respondents.302 Applying 
a presumption of MOE status on most Chinese enterprises and a sepa-
rate-rate style test on the rest would simplify the identification process, 
and as shown, the combination approach proposed is administratively 
feasible. 
Valuation methodology lies at the heart of our unfair trade laws, be-
cause it determines whether and to what extent certain goods will be pe-
nalized upon entering this country. Whatever valuation method we adopt 
should be tailored to the economic reality of the country wherein and 
individual enterprise by which the good was produced. A method that 
balances a pro-market position with our international commitments will 
succeed in encouraging reciprocity that will ultimately lead to growth in 
the long-term. 
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